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Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice
Eric A. Posner* & Adrian Vermeule**
The study of “transitional justice” is a rapidly expanding subfield at the
intersection of jurisprudence, comparative politics, and political theory.1 In the wake of
the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the democratization of South Africa, and the
ever-increasing popularity of international human rights talk, an academic literature has
arisen (or at least greatly expanded2) that examines regime transitions in developing
nations. Typically, this literature aims to identify distinctive jurisprudential, moral and
institutional dilemmas or problems of transitional justice. Should the new regime use
retroactive criminal and civil law to punish officials or collaborators of the old regime?
Should it undertake a campaign of “lustration,” or the attempt to impose
disenfranchisement, ineligibility for office, or other legal disabilities on the old regime’s
adherents? What of reparation and restitution to redress pre-transition violations of civil
rights or property rights?
In opposition to this work, we make two linked claims. First, the theorists of
transitional justice commonly err by treating regime transitions as a self-contained
subject, thereby denying the relevance or utility of comparisons and analogies between
regime transitions, on the one hand, and the wide variety of transitions that occur in the
legal systems of consolidated democracies, on the other.3 Sometimes this is an explicit
claim, as when Shklar says of Nuremberg and other transitional trials that “all analogies
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drawn from municipal law . . . are unconvincing”;4 sometimes it is an implicit but
necessary assumption, as when Elster examines the “moral dilemmas” of transitional
justice without reference to obvious intrasystem analogies.5 Against this view, we urge
that legal and political transitions lie on a continuum, of which regime transitions are
merely the endpoint.
To take only the example of American domestic law, consider the transitions
produced by a spate of constitutional amendments, such as the aftermath of the Civil
War; difficult transitions from one government to another, such as the contested elections
of 1800, 1876 and 2000; transitions created by changes in criminal and civil law or
procedure, such as the judicial identification of new constitutional rights; and quotidian
changes in economic and social regulation and taxation, or in common-law entitlements.6
All of these transitions might, and many did, pose questions of retroactivity, personnel
management and compensation usefully analogous to those arising after regime
transitions. The varieties of transition implicate similar considerations, even if those
considerations have different weights at different points on the continuum; the problem of
compensation for the deprivation of pre-transition property, for example, is analogous in
both takings law and in regime transitions. There are differences of degree between
regime transitions and intrasystem transitions. But there are also differences of degree
between large-scale intrasystem transitions, such as constitutional amendments, and
small-scale ones, such as changes in the tax code; it is by no means clear that the former
set of differences is somehow larger or more consequential than the latter.
In general, the analysts of transitional justice, who are typically steeped in moral
theory, political theory and science, or in highly theorized international law, have gone
wrong through insufficient appreciation of the ordinary law of consolidated democracies.
They have erred, not by virtue of inadequate moral or political analysis, but by holding a
stereotyped picture of ordinary justice, one in which all laws are always prospective,
individuals costlessly obtain compensation for all harms to person or property inflicted by
others, and transitions essentially never occur because the legal system runs smoothly in
settled equilibrium. In our picture, by contrast, ordinary lawmaking must routinely cope
with policy shifts caused by economic and technological shocks and by changes in the
value judgments of citizens and legal elites. These jarring discontinuities predictably
4

Judith Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials 167 (1964). Although the reference to
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below.
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create transition problems. The law has developed a range of pragmatic tools for
managing such problems while maintaining social order, ensuring some stability of
expectations, and occasionally aspiring to see justice done. None of this commits us to
defending all of the law’s pragmatic tools of transition-management, which are in some
cases excessively crude, inadequately theorized, or defended on specious grounds. But it
should explode the assumption that transitional justice is a distinctive topic that presents a
distinct set of moral and jurisprudential dilemmas.
Our second claim results from the first. Given that transitional justice is
continuous with ordinary justice, there is no reason to treat transitional-justice measures
as presumptively suspect, on either moral or institutional grounds, unless we are to treat
the justice systems of nontransitional liberal democracies as suspect as well. The
dominant instinct among academic commentators on transitional justice is to condemn
transitional-justice measures wholesale, either on the ground that transitional measures
are retroactive and thus inherently illiberal, or on the closely associated ground that new
regimes should reserve their energies exclusively for forward-looking measures of statebuilding, economic growth, and the development of political cohesion. But this posture is
no more coherent than would be a parallel condemnation of all the measures that legal
systems ordinarily use to manage change. In any legal system, we will argue, transition
problems are inevitable; retrospective measures themselves have important forwardlooking justifications; and to forego any retrospective measures is an implausibly extreme
solution to the transition problem, one that very few new regimes have adopted. The
attempt to eschew transitional measures is itself a transitional measure, and usually a poor
one. There will of course be good pragmatic reasons to object to particular transitional
schemes, programs and measures, and we will provide pragmatic evaluations as the
discussion proceeds. There is no global reason, however, to treat transitional justice as
suspect.
Part I provides an overview of the transitional-justice literature, defines the
problems addressed in that literature, and introduces the institutional tools of transitional
justice, including criminal and civil trials, truth commissions, lustration, and reparations.
Part II turns to analysis. We examine serially a range of issues that arise in transitionaljustice situations, issues that are said or assumed to represent distinctive dilemmas of
transitional justice. In each case, we show that the problems are at most overblown
versions of ordinary legal problems; in the worst cases, transitional-justice theorists have
reinvented the wheel, identifying transitional-justice conundrums without reference to
identical problems in domestic legal settings. In each case, we also examine the
consequences of the relevant programs or measures, finding that transitional measures
rarely result in illiberal repression, and often achieve pragmatic success. A brief
conclusion follows.
I. OVERVIEW
A. Conceptual framework
Every transition creates a divide between the old regime and the new regime.
Victims of the old regime frequently demand justice against those whom they regard as
perpetrators. The perpetrators include officials of the old regime—such as dictators, party
4

leaders, judges, bureaucrats, and soldiers—and collaborators among the civilian
population, including business and religious leaders, union officials, and ordinary folk
who inform on their friends and neighbors. The victims argue that they were unjustly
deprived of jobs, positions, educations, and property. Officials in the new regime, who
were often victims of the old regime, must decide how to answer these calls for
transitional justice.
The tools of transitional justice include trials, truth commissions, reparations,
apologies, and purges. These tools will be chosen as part of a transition policy comprising
economic, political, and legal reform. Often, but not always, the tools of transitional
justice conflict with other policy goals. Purges, for example, further political reform by
eliminating the influence of officials of the prior regime, but also interfere with political
reform by depriving the new state of people with administrative skills. Even when
transitional justice and political reform imply consistent policies, these might conflict
with other goals like economic reform. Reparations, for example, serve justice by
compensating victims of the old regime, and political reform by taking resources from
people who threaten the new regime; but reparations might also unsettle property rights
and interfere with economic reform.
Whether tools of transitional justice conflict with policy goals depends in part on
how transitional justice is understood. In the literature, writers generally understand
transitional justice as backward looking: compensating victims for their losses; punishing
wrongdoers and forcing individuals to disgorge property that was wrongfully acquired;
and revealing the truth about past events. But transitional justice can also be understood
in forward looking terms: providing a method for the public to recapture lost traditions
and institutions; depriving former officials of political and economic influence that they
could use to frustrate reform; signaling a commitment to property rights, the market, and
democratic institutions; and establishing constitutional precedents that may deter future
leaders from repeating the abuses of the old regime. Thus, where adherents to backward
looking conceptions of justice see transitional justice measures as desirable except when
they undermine reform, adherents to forward looking conceptions of justice will see
transitional justice measures and policy considerations as identical or mutually
reinforcing.
The tools of transitional justice take many forms. Trials are usually public
proceedings in which legal forms are used as much as possible. Perpetrators from the old
regime are charged with crimes, are often given lawyers and a chance to defend
themselves, might be allowed to cross-examine witness, and often enjoy other procedural
protections. There is a spectrum with the show trial on the one end, and the regular
domestic criminal or civil trial on the other; trials conducted for the purpose of achieving
transitional justice usually lie in between. Other trials are conducted by truth
commissions, whose purpose is to reveal the identities of collaborators or perpetrators,
and the nature of their activities, but not to punish except by exposing participants to
public outrage; those who participate are often given amnesties.
The law applied against the defendant in these trials varies considerably. It can be
new law that applies ex post facto; old law that was on the books of the old regime but
never enforced; international law that was nominally respected in the old regime but not
incorporated into the legal system; or old law that was in fact enforced but not, for
5

improper reasons, against the perpetrators who are now on trial. Some posttransition
governments employ the intermediate device of retroactively extending statutes of
limitations that had expired.
Ordinary criminal punishments are imposed against perpetrators—jail, death—but
of special importance for transitional justice is the purge or lustration. These terms have
slightly different meanings: purges occur when the perpetrators are thrown out of office,
with or without a trial. Lustration, as it occurred in Czechoslovakia7 after the 1989
revolution, involved the public exposure of collaborators who were otherwise not know
as such, along with a prohibition against their serving in office for a period of time.
Related is the formal admission of past crimes, required in some states like South Africa
as a condition for amnesty after testimony before a truth commission.8
Every transition is different, and the requirements of transitional justice for one
transition will typically differ from the requirements for another. When the old regime is
extremely repressive—South Africa or the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, not Imperial
Britain in colonial America—then the demands for justice will be stronger. When the last
government of the old regime yield power willingly rather than provoking a violent
revolution—Hungary or Poland, not old regime France or czarist Russia—then those who
take power might feel constrained to treat perpetrators with leniency. When the old
regime was highly secretive but did not interfere too much with property rights, then truth
commissions and trials might be more important than reparations. And resource
constraints, the urgency of economic reform, the degree to which revanchist elements
continue to pose a threat, the dangerousness of the international environment, and the
extent of collaboration across the population will also place practical constraints on the
level of transitional justice that can be achieved.
B. Criteria for Evaluating Transitions
All transitions have multiple goals. Every transition seeks political reform, and
the transition can be judged by quality of the political reforms achieved. Many transitions
also seek economic reform, and can be judged by their success in creating a vibrant
market economy. Thus, we can distinguish the mainly political transitions in Spain,
Portugal, and Greece in the early 1970s, from the combined political and economic
transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and parts of Asia in 1989 and the 1990s. Spain,
Portugal, and Greece are usually counted as political successes. Among the latter group,
Poland, Hungary, Estonia, and the Czech Republic are the main political and economic
successes. Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union are not as successful.
Post-1989 economic and political success appears to go hand in hand.9
What is transitional justice? It means something different from the successful
accomplishment of a political or economic transition: it means a political and economic
7

Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. When we refer to laws enacted in
Czechoslovakia and carried over into the Czech Republic, we will refer to Czechoslovakia and to the Czech
Republic as the context requires.
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9
Nations in Transit 2001, at 27 tble. B (Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander J. Motyl, Amanda Schnetzer eds.
2001).
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transition that is consistent with liberal and democratic commitments.10 A regime change
should involve a minimum of violence and instability, and should respect rights. People
should either retain their property rights, or be compensated for their loss. Officials and
supporters of the old regime should not be punished for legal acts. They should not be
mistreated and humiliated, or denied trials. They should not be scapegoated, and instead
they should be invited to participate as equal citizens in the new regime. Supporters of the
new regime should not profit from the transition, or manipulate it for personal ends.
However, these elements of transitional justice reflect ideals that are not met even
in a consolidated liberal democracy such as that of the United States. In judging whether
a transition has been just, it is important not to hold it to ideals that are unrealistic. And
yet the literature does just that—either condemning transitions for violating these ideals
or condemning any effort at transitional justice because it must fail one or more of these
ideals. A more productive approach is to judge transitions against the standards used in
consolidated liberal democracies, which must deal with their own transition problems,
albeit not transitions at the level of regime. These standards reflect liberal commitments
leavened with prudential concern for good transition management—which involves,
among other things, maintaining valuable political structures, satisfying some illiberal
popular demands, and doing substantive justice that might violate liberal norms. The
same considerations apply at the level of the regime. Transitional justice is not achieved
when rigid adherence to liberal norms results in political collapse and a return to
authoritarianism. Transitional justice allows a balancing of liberal commitments and
political precautions. It is achieved when those norms are respected to the extent
necessary to, and consistent with, the consolidation of liberal democratic institutions.
C. Transition Processes
A useful analysis of political transitions distinguishes transitions that are led by
the elite of the old regime, those that are forced on the elite by the opposition, those that
are bargains between the elite and the opposition, and those that are imposed by a foreign
nation.11 An example of elite leadership is the Spanish transition of the early 1970s. After
the death of Franco, King Juan Carlos initiated democratic and liberal reforms. Chile
(1989), Hungary (1989), Russia (1991), and Bulgaria (1992) also fit this model. An
example of opposition leadership is the defeat of the Greek colonels in the 1970s by a
coalition of civil and military groups, which reinstated Greece’s earlier constitutional
democracy. Portugal (1976) and Argentina (1983) also fit this model, as do—although at
a remove—the great French and American progenitors. An example of a bargain is the
Polish transition that culminated in 1989: this was the result of the growth of the
Solidarity union as a major but illegal political force. The threat of economic disruption
through work stoppages strengthened reformers in the Communist Party and led to a
negotiated transition to, initially, a quasi-democracy. Brazil (1985), Uruguay (1985), and
Czechoslovakia (1989) fit this model. An example of foreign leadership is the treatment
of Germany, Japan, and Italy after World War II. The victorious allies forcibly ended the
old regime and returned sovereignty to the states only after elites demonstrated a
10

We follow the bulk of the literature in focusing on transitions to liberal democracy; we do not express an
opinion on whether transitional justice can be achieved for other kinds of transitions.
11
Samuel Huntingon, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 114 (1991): he uses
the needlessly obscure terms transformation, replacement, transplacement, and intervention.
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commitment to liberal democracy. Foreign countries also sparked wartime transitions in
France, Belgium, Denmark, and other conquered countries, but because the quisling
governments in those countries enjoyed little legitimacy, transitional justice was managed
by returned governments in exile, former resistance groups, and the native population
rather than by the liberators.
These four models are ideal types, but provide a useful starting point. An
extensive literature discusses why one path occurs rather than another in particular
countries, and the political effects of the different paths,12 but for our purposes what is
most interesting is the possibility that the kind of transition affects the kind of transitional
justice that will occur. A pattern of sorts emerges (see Table 1, below). Where the elites
lead the transition, transitional justice is limited. Where the opposition or a foreign nation
leads the transition, transitional justice is significant. Where the elite and the opposition
enter a bargain, transitional justice is moderate. In short, transitional justice declines as
the influence of the elite increases. The explanation for this pattern is that elites try to
shield themselves from post-transitional punishments when they lead the transition, and
to extract concessions when the transition is the result of bargaining. Powerful opposition
groups resist these efforts; weak opposition groups submit to them.
Patterns like this one have engaged the interest of political scientists, who have
sought to discover the social, political, and economic factors that are associated with
successful regime transitions.13 But transitional justice mechanisms have received little
attention; they are treated as superstructure. Our approach, by contrast, takes them
seriously both as causal factors that may contribute to or undermine the success of a
transition, and as political phenomena that can be evaluated legally and morally.
D. Some History and Examples
The establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions at the level of the
nation state is, like the nation state itself, a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. In
earlier periods one could find democratic institutions in city states or small republics, and
one could find partially democratic institutions in larger entities like England. The
American and French revolutions did not immediately create nationwide democracies.
The United States had to wait for the expansion of the franchise in the early nineteenth
century. The French revolution degenerated into terror and then the Napoleonic
dictatorship. Still, both revolutions led to significant efforts at transitional justice. In the
American states, British loyalists and collaborators were tried and punished in great
numbers. There were also significant purges, though they varied by state.14 France gave
us the trial of Louis XVI as well as thousands of executions of lesser folk.
By the end of the nineteenth century, France, Great Britain, and a few other
smaller countries had become democracies—in the sense of having a relatively broad
franchise and electoral competition. In this “first wave” of democratization, as
Huntington describes it, democratization occurred in most countries gradually, with some

12

See, for example, chapters in Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, Guillermo
A. O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, eds. (1986).
13
See, e.g., O’Donnell et al, supra note 9.
14
See, e.g., Claud Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American Revolution (1959).
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setbacks such as the consolidation of authoritarian power after the revolutions of 1848.15
Transitional justice, however, is not associated with gradualism, and there are few
examples of transitional justice from the major nineteenth century democratic transitions.
Huntington’s second wave of democratization is the period from 1943 to 1962. It
begins with the spread of democracy to states defeated and occupied by the Western
allies during World War II, and continues with the decolonization of India and other
states in Asia and Africa.16 Two kinds of transitional justice occurred. The allied
governments tried and punished many of the leaders of Nazi Germany, Italy, and Japan;
they also tried to force the posttransition government to continue the process with
criminal prosecutions of lower level officials. And the posttransition governments of
defeated allies—France, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, and so forth—tried and punished
collaborators and officials in the puppet governments during the war.
The third wave of democratization, which began in 1974 in Portugal, had three
phases: Southern Europe during the 1970s, Latin American during the 1980s, and Eastern
Europe beginning in 1989. These transitions are, for our purposes, the purest. Because
they were all sudden rather than gradual, they created a sharp divide between an old
regime and a new regime, and gave the new regime opportunities for doing justice
against members of the old regime. Because these transitions were not directly the result
of foreign aid of a defeated regime or intervention against an aggressor, there is relatively
little confusion about whether transitional justice reflects the needs of the local
population or the interests of a foreign occupier. And because the old regime had in most
cases existed for many years, and had sunk roots deep into society, the problems of
transitional justice were posed with special acuteness.
Table 1 displays a selection of transitions. The purpose is not to provide a
complete accounting but to give the reader a sense of the variation. We have left out postWorld War I transitions; some of the post-World War II transitions such as those of
Denmark, Greece, and Holland; many of the Latin American transitions (including the
quasi-transition of Mexico with the destruction of the PRI’s hegemony), which have
often been quite gradual and difficult to distinguish from normal politics; most transitions
in Africa, which present their own set of distinct issues because of the prevalence of
warfare and the shallowness of modern political institutions; the transitions of many of
the countries dominated by the former Soviet Union; and the transitions of the states that
emerged from the fragments of Yugoslavia. The second column provides the year at
which the transition begins but not the entire period of transition which in many cases is
subject to debate. The next three columns contain information about the use of trials,
purges, and reparations. The penultimate column has the political origin of the transition:
bargain, opposition led, elite led, or foreign led. The last column says whether there was
an economic transition as well.

15
16

Huntington, supra note __ at 16-17.
Id. at 18-19.
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Table 1: Selected Transitions17
Panel A: 18th-19th Centuries
State

Year Trials

United States 1776

yes

France

yes

1789

Lustration/Purges

Reparations

type of
econ
transition trans.

yes

no

opposition- no
led
opposition- no
led

Panel B: Post-World War II
Germany

1945

Japan

Military trials 1945-49; High ranking Nazi,
Significant payments to Foreign
criminal trials in
gov’t officials;
victims, Israel
Germany after 1955
screening of population

no

yes

[probably]

not until 1990s, to
Korean “comfort
women”

Foreign

no

Collaborators

Denmark

1945

Criminal trials of
collaborators

None

Foreign

no

France

1944

Trials of Vichy officials stripped political,
None
and collaborators;
economic rights; police,
executions
military, media purged

Foreign

no

Belgium

1944

Military trial of
collaborators; loss of
political, civil rights
possible; executions

Government agencies None
purged of collaborators

Foreign

no

Italy

1944

Trials of Fascist gov’t
officials; mostly
leaders, some rank and
file tried in different
courts

purge of Fascists,
None
beneficiaries of regime,
“corrupt persons”;
limited to major cities,
not effective

Foreign

no

government, military,
and union officials; in
second wave widened
purges

opposition- no
led

Panel C: Southern Europe—1970s
Portugal

1974

Military officers tried,
often given light
sentences

Greece

1974

officials, military police Many military officers Reinstatement, some
officers tried
purged; national and
pensions restored
local gov’t officials,
educators dismissed;
minor officials
transferred; some
business figures purged

opposition- no
led

Spain

1975

none

elite-led

none

none

none

no

17

Sources: Peter E. Quint, The Imperfect Union: Constitutional Structures of German Unification (1997)
(East Germany); O’Donnell et al., supra note 10 (Latin America); 2 Transitional Justice, supra note 1; The
Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism, Jon Elster ed. (1996); Gerard Roland, Transitions
and Economics: Politics, Markets and Firms (2000).
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Panel D: Latin America—1980s
Argentina

1983

Some trials of military None
officers and police
chiefs and officials

$100’s of millions paid opposition- no
to victims
led

Brazil

1985

None

None

Bargain

no

Uruguay

1985

some unsuccessful
None
lawsuits by victims;
doctors involved in
torture tried by medical
association

Civil servants fired by
military allowed to
return, regained
pensions

Bargain

no

Chile

1989

some trials for human
rights violation; truth
commission

None

victims received
elite-led
pensions; student
financial aid; medical
care; $10’s of millions
paid

no

None

Panel E: Eastern Europe—1989-1991
Czechoslovakia

1989 statutes of limitation
adjusted to allow
prosecution of gov’t
officials

Communist party
officials, secret police,
high military officers,
collaborators, some
businessmen

some confiscated
Bargain
property, in other cases
property returned;
victims of political
crimes (or survivors)
granted compensation;
seized church property
returned

yes

Hungary

1989 International
conventions adopted to
aid trial where statutes
of limitation had
expired

Screening based on
tribunals and gov’t files
of politicians, gov’t
officials, police,
education and media
employees

compensation for
seized property;
vouchers; seized land
auctioned;
compensation to
political prisoners,
survivors

elite-led

yes

Poland

1989

no law until 1999;
screening of all state
officials

church property

Bargain

yes

East Germany 1989 trials of border guards
and some leaders

civil service, incl.
property expropriated Bargain
judges, lawyers,
1933-45 and after 1949
academics, bureaucrats

yes

Russia

1991 None

None

yes

Lithuania

1991 Arrests, trials based on KGB officials,
Owners, heirs could
KGB files; mostly
collaborators barred
seek return of property
related to independence from office for 5 years or compensation
movement

compensation to
elite-led
victims of political
crimes, pensions and
other aid, preferential
access to gov’t services

yes

11

Bulgaria

1992 Major figures in
previous gov’t tried

high level Communists
and candidates, security
and military officers,
some educators banned
from office

Amnesty and monetary elite-led
compensation to
political victims and
exiled persons;
nationalized land
returned to former
owners, or paid for

Albania

1992 Former gov’t officials,
party members tried for
economic crimes and
human rights violations

Unofficial purges
Seized property
removed former
returned or
Communists from
compensation was paid
office; purge legislation
deemed
unconstitutional

yes

yes

Panel F: Other Recent Transitions
South Korea

1987

Trials of officials
responsible for crimes
before 1960; trials for
economic crimes

South Africa

1995

truth commission

Uganda

1986

None

Police, military purged; None
corrupt officials
exposed
anticipated but will be
trivial
None

None

Bargain

no

Bargain

no
no

II. ANALYSIS
A. Depleting Government of Skilled Officials
A recurring problem in cases of regime change is how the new regime is to be
staffed. Prosecutions and lustration may clear the way for adherents of the new regime,
both latecomers and former members of the resistance or democratic opposition, to
assume offices previously held by apparatchiks or functionaries of the old regime. The
new regime’s populace will resent being governed by the same old bureaucrats with new
titles. Yet the more deeply the old regime was entrenched, and the longer it persisted, the
more likely it is that its functionaries approach a monopoly of administrative and
technical expertise in the ordinary business of government, and are thus indispensable to
the new regime. Former resisters or revolutionaries are disproportionately the very people
who have been denied technical educations or political office; indeed they are often
among those seeking compensation precisely on the ground that the old regime deprived
them of educational and professional opportunities.
The personnel dilemma facing new regimes, then, is that popular demand for
replacement of old functionaries will be greatest when the old functionaries’ expertise is
most essential. Consider the Hobson’s choice facing democratic West Germany in the
period after World War II. The judiciary had been heavily complicit in the Nazi regime,
so much so that the occupying powers considered “closing all German courts for ten
years and replacing them with a ‘colonial’ system, so that a new generation of judges
could be educated in the meantime.”18 Of course this proposal was never adopted, and the
later failure of denazification of the judiciary meant that plaintiffs seeking compensation
18
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or restitution for Nazi rights-violations were often outraged to find that the judges hearing
their suits were the same judges who had permitted the original abuses.19
As these points imply, the severity of the staffing problem varies with the depth of
the old regime’s entrenchment and the circumstances of the new regime’s accession. At
one extreme are cases in which the old regime was short-lived, perhaps because it
represented a fleeting imposition by the external military force of a foreign nation, and in
which a large cadre of noncollaborationist personnel can quickly resume office and
reinstate the previously-existing institutions. The clear examples here are countries such
as Belgium and the Netherlands after the overthrow of the Nazi occupation;
governments-in-exile quickly reassumed power and staffed their institutions with preoccupation elites. On the other hand, the socialist government in Belgium “interpreted”
the penal code to exempt many economic collaborators from punishment, on the strictly
pragmatic ground that the commercial and industrial classes were indispensable to
economic recovery.20 This emphasizes that the personnel problem can reach beyond
formally designated bureaucracies.
At the other extreme are the Iron Curtain nations. Although in a real sense subject
to foreign military power, the communist hegemony in those nations was far more
durable and extensive than the Nazi hegemony in the Benelux countries, and mid-level
officials were implicated in the repressive regime to a far greater degree, so that there is
no obvious pool of politically clean candidates for the new regime’s posts. An exception
to this generalization is the GDR, which represents an important special case. There the
unification with the FRG created a natural pool of highly efficient civil servants ready to
assume the functions of the GDR bureaucracy, so that the major personnel problem
concerning former GDR functionaries is how they may be productively employed at all.21
Some commentators appeal to the personnel dilemma as a pragmatic
consideration that should block transitional measures, especially lustration schemes. As
Clause Offe puts it, “[c]ountries which rely extensively on [lustration] may deprive
themselves of significant portions of the managerial and administrative manpower and
talent that they depend upon in the process of economic reconstruction.”22 Indisputably
that is so. The question is what follows, and whether doing so is worth the costs. The
least plausible solutions are the extreme ones, either a sweeping purge or total
bureaucratic continuity.23 Well-designed schemes can finesse the dilemma, maintaining a
critical mass of useful old-regime personnel while excising the officials who present the
greatest threat to the new regime or whose presence would create the greatest public
offense.
Nontransitional analogies to the personnel dilemma illustrate the point. Regime
change is just one type of transition; personnel dilemmas also inevitably arise from
changes in legal and public norms within a given constitutional regime. Where such
19
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changes are (in historical perspective) relatively sudden and discrete, creating sharp
discontinuities with past practices, the personnel problems may in many cases be as
severe, or more so, than in cases of regime change proper. Officials in power under the
new regime, or candidates and nominees for office, will routinely face scrutiny for their
collaboration with the preexisting system of laws and norms, and the debate will follow
the same lines as in cases of regime change. Ideological adherents of the new equilibrium
will condemn the official for his past, normatively objectionable behavior; others will
respond that judging the official’s past behavior by current norms is unfairly retroactive,
and will deprive the government of personnel who are technically qualified for office.
Importantly, however, these debates rarely result in wholesale purges or wholesale
rehabilitation of the old system’s adherents. The solutions that tend to prevail rehabilitate
the rank-and-file, purge leaders and conspicuous ideologues, and produce a legal and
normative equilibrium that bars open praise for the discredited regime while discouraging
repeated witch-hunts for old collaborators.
To make all this concrete, consider the following examples, from American legal
history, of changes in law and norms that produced personnel and appointments
controversies:
Postbellum lustration of Confederate officials: A major issue after the Civil War,
until the enactment of the (mild) lustration provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
involved the power of federal and state legislators to bar from public offices otherwisequalified experts and candidates who had fought for or served secessionist states. In many
of those states, the cadre of personnel who had served secessionist governments were
drawn from local elites who also provided most of the available pool of personnel for
Reconstruction governments. In some states pro-secession elites made a relatively
smooth transition into the new governments, especially after the North’s abandonment of
Reconstruction in 1876. Reconstruction governments in some places and at some periods
undertook projects of lustration and disenfranchisement, but in two landmark cases the
Supreme Court invalidated state and federal statutes that disqualified former
Confederates from designated offices and occupations. The arguments for invalidation
blended a charge of unconstitutionally retroactive punishment with the claim that the
statutes deprived the affected institutions of the services of highly qualified personnel.
The eventual equilibrium that the political system reached involved the widespread civil
rehabilitation of former Confederate officials, especially through presidential pardons,
and the temporary exclusion from federal and state offices of former federal officeholders
who had subsequently joined the Confederacy (thus combining rebellion with violation of
the federal official oath to support the Constitution).
Many have criticized that equilibrium as insufficiently stringent, and it may have
been. Our point here is just that the personnel problem is not some intractable dilemma of
transitional justice. It is a managerial hurdle that in which compromise solutions and
detailed policy design usually win out over the extreme positions in either direction. Note
too that it is essentially irrelevant, in this regard, whether we categorize the changes in
constitutional and public norms produced by the Civil War as intrasystem change or as
effective regime change. Perhaps the War’s fundamental alteration of domestic political
dynamics counts as transitional in a strong sense, although the nominal constitutional
framework remained unaltered during the period at issue in the lustration decisions, and
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even the constitutional amendments that Congress eventually produced were in many
respects unimpressive. But the difficulty of categorizing the Civil War’s effects as either
regime change or as intrasystem change merely emphasizes the uncertain boundaries of
“transitional justice.” The retroactive application of new legal and political norms creates
personnel problems for post-transition governments whether or not large-scale regime
change has occurred.
The development of the civil service. Every election year creates a transition
problem, writ small. New presidents want to reward supporters with governmental posts,
punish enemies with the loss of office, and exert control over a sluggish and potentially
recalcitrant bureaucracy. A natural constraint, however, is that career bureaucrats possess
expertise and information, or at least familiarity with administrative routines, that
political appointees cannot duplicate. The same basic dynamic also affects the agencies’
other master, the standing congressional committees. The majority party in Congress
wants executive appointees that share its views, or (if the President is of the other party)
that represent the other party’s moderate wing. But committees also form ongoing
relationships with high-level career bureaucrats who may have been appointed by a
previous administration with a different ideological slant, and who have cross-cutting
institutional agendas. Neither the President nor Congress, then, desires a wholesale
bloodletting after every political transition, but each desires to exert a measure of political
control over the agencies.
Congress and the executive branch have jointly created a humdrum but effective
structure of statutes, regulations and practices that accommodate these twin concerns, by
splitting differences and emphasizing mixed solutions. Most bureaucrats are civil
servants with relatively stringent legal protections against political discharge, including
review by an independent agency (the Merit Systems Protection Board); the Hatch Act
protects them from being pressed into service in political campaigns. Scattered across the
top level of the bureaucracy, however, are a range of political positions that new
administrations fill with their adherents. In the most optimistic account of the resulting
equilibrium, career bureaucrats, whose career investment is protected against sudden
political expropriation, develop technical expertise to be put at the service of politically
accountable policymakers. In practice things are not so rosy—political appointees have
difficulty establishing policy control and forcing bureaucrats to reveal information -- but
the large-scale problem of personnel transitions has been successfully muted.
The canonization of Brown. In 1954, when the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education24 held public school segregation unconstitutional, leading
experts in constitutional law could declare it wrongly decided, even lawless. Well into the
1960s the Court adopted a tentative remedial approach, and massive resistance in the
South supported reluctance to enforce Brown on the part of Congress and the President.
Strikingly, however, by about the mid-1980s Brown had become a canonical case in
American constitutional law—a fixed point whose validity any viable account of
constitutional theory had to assume. Mainstream constitutional academics considered it
an unanswerable charge against originalist revisionists, such as Robert Bork, that
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originalism had difficulty demonstrating Brown to be correct.25 (We might of course
quibble with the categorization of Brown’s transformation as norm change; a tendentious
textualist claim might be that Brown represented a “judicial amendment” of the
Constitution. But from the standpoint of constitutional politics Brown is just a standard
case, albeit a consequential one, of changing judicial interpretation of a capacious and
ambiguous constitutional text.)
The important point is that the canonization of Brown predictably spilled over into
personnel decisions. The most dramatic case involved William Rehnquist. When
confirmed as Associate Justice in 1971, Rehnquist’s attitude towards Brown was a
nonissue. When nominated for the Chief Justiceship in 198--, a major political
controversy erupted when it was discovered that in 1954, serving as law clerk to Justice
Jackson while Brown was being decided, Rehnquist had written a memo arguing for
upholding public school segregation. Rehnquist was eventually confirmed, but only after
in effect disavowing the memo by claiming that it did not, even at the time, represent his
personal views. A principal argument of Rehnquist’s defenders was that to impose
current norms on past behavior would deprive the public of the services of an official
highly qualified for the post in other respects.
The triumph of the civil rights movement. The point about Brown generalizes,
both beyond constitutional law and beyond judicial confirmations. Endorsement of white
supremacy and segregation was the centerpiece of Dixiecrat presidential candidacies in
1948 and 1956; by 1964, with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, no significant
presidential candidate could openly defend those institutions. Yet many current
officeholders have been, or could be, implicated as collaborators with or supporters of
Jim Crow. The resulting equilibrium of legal and political norms is complex. A ritualistic
confession of error or a change of heart usually suffices to immunize former
segregationists against public outcry. Consider Strom Thurmond, who has been re-elected
to the Senate continuously since 1950 despite having staged an important prosegregationist presidential campaign in 1948—but only because Thurmond has publicly
disavowed his former views.26 By contrast, any public expression suggesting that the
officeholder currently supports white supremacy is sure to create a political firestorm;
compare Thurmond with Trent Lott, who lost his post as Senate Majority Leader for
praising Thurmond’s 1948 campaign in terms suggesting current racial animus.27
It is not hard to explain this equilibrium in straightforwardly functional terms. To
bar from public life any person who once collaborated in Jim Crow would radically
deplete the pool of available legislators, bureaucrats and judges, and might create a
backlash effect that would, perversely, increase public statements of racial hostility. This
sort of explanation elides difficult questions about the mechanisms that give rise to
complex norm-equilibria. Yet it is undeniable that the current norms, whether or not
morally justifiable in some ultimate sense, have a rough pragmatic logic about them; their
effect is to reinforce a public consensus against white supremacy while avoiding the high
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social costs of a campaign against white supremacy’s former adherents.28 Strikingly
similar equilibria obtain in transitional societies in which collaboration with the old
regime was widespread, such as Germany after denazification or the post-communist
regimes of Eastern Europe. In such societies it is common knowledge that many, perhaps
most might be implicated in the old regime’s wrongdoing, but large-scale campaigns of
exposure and lustration either quickly lose steam or never get underway in the first place.
But moderate, targeted lustration schemes succeed in eliminating a small but important
layer of the old regime’s critical officials, while law and public norms both constrain
post-transition public discourse by stipulating that no public expression of current support
for the old regime’s policies is permitted.29
B. Unsettling Property Rights
In many pretransitional states, governments take property from individuals and
give it to others. Sometimes, the property is given to political officials, cronies, and
collaborators. Sometimes, the property is given to poor people, or displaced people,
workers or farmers. Sometimes—the usual case for Communist dictatorships—the
property is kept by the government. If the confiscation occurred a long time in the past,
then the people who hold or use the property at the time of the transition are usually not
the original transferees. They are the children or grandchildren of the transferees, or they
are purchasers of the property who may or may not know of the original confiscation. Or
they are employees or tenants of the government.
When the transition occurs, the original victims—or their relatives or
descendants—argue that the confiscated property should be returned to them, or that they
should be compensated for the loss of the property. In many states these claims have
fallen on receptive ears. States such as the Czech Republic and Hungary have created
procedures for returning property to the original owners or their descendants, including
institutions such as the Church. Current property holders sometimes receive credits if
they have improved the property; and sometimes they are allowed to keep the property, in
which case the original owners receive monetary compensation. Other states finance
restitution from tax revenues, and allow current holders of confiscated property to retain
title. But most transitional governments have not created restitution programs, or have
limited them to a small class of victims.
Critics of restitution programs argue that they unsettle property rights.30 For a
transition to succeed, this argument holds, the posttransitional economy must generate
substantial wealth. Otherwise, the public will blame democracy for economic failure, and
antidemocratic elements surviving from the old regime will obtain power and prestige.
An economy will generate substantial wealth only if it is a market economy in which
property rights are recognized and enforced; and creating an atmosphere friendly to
28
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property rights is particularly important in the postcommunist states, which are
undergoing economic transitions as well as political transitions. But restitution programs
have precisely the wrong effect. They grant new claims to numberless victims of the old
regime. If these claims are to be satisfied from general revenues, then they will become a
potentially unlimited burden on budgets for the indefinite future, when revenues are
urgently needed for economic reform, transfers to the elderly and others who lose out
from the transition, cleanup of the environment, establishment of an honest bureaucracy,
and countless other exigencies next to which claims for reparative justice seem like a
luxury. If the claims are to be satisfied through disgorgement of real or personal property
taken from the victims and now owned by descendants of the wrongdoers, or innocent
third parties who received the property through grants or purchases, then the claims will
create frictions in the market economy.
What are these frictions? The creation of new claims by themselves would not,
under standard economic assumptions, injure the market. If all claims were immediately
recognized and announced to the world, then both losers and winners would know the
extent of their existing property interests, and invest and trade accordingly. To be sure,
some existing property rights would be fragmented, but others would be combined and
adjusted in other ways. There is no reason to think the status quo distribution of property
rights (real or implicit) in an inefficient communist or quasi-communist economy are
efficient. Regardless of how property rights are distributed during the transition, trade
will be necessary in order to divide and combine them in response to market forces.
There is no reason to think that more trades would be necessary if restitutionary claims
were recognized.
The frictions arise from uncertainty about the restitutionary rights, including what
they are, who holds them, how they will be enforced. When the government announces a
restitution program, thousands or millions of claims spring into existence, and each one
must be painstakingly adjudicated. People will be reluctant to invest in or buy land or
other property until they know whether it is burdened by valid claims. But this makes it
clear that the amount of uncertainty is a decision variable. A state can reduce uncertainty
by requiring that all claims be filed within six months, as Czechoslovakia did, and by
using expedited procedures. And uncertainty about property rights, if kept to a moderate
level, is a cost that is often worth bearing, as domestic experience shows.
In domestic law, property rights are always uncertain—their precise contours are
unknown and cannot be determined at reasonable cost. An owner’s title to property is
vulnerable to the claim of a prior owner from whom the property was stolen. Title in real
estate is vulnerable to adverse possession if the owner does not occupy it. In the United
States, title to land in many areas is vulnerable to claims of Indian tribes whose land was
taken from them illegally by a state government or by the federal government. Title to
personal property can be vulnerable to security interests that do not need to be recorded.
Title—or, more accurately, the value of property under title—is vulnerable to
uncompensated regulatory takings or ordinary takings that are inadequately compensated
under the law. Indeed, nothing prevents the U.S. government, and state governments,
from raising property taxes or any other general tax to such an extent as to undermine the
value of holding particular kinds of property. Title is preserved but as an empty form; the
value of property ownership is qualified by the risk of changes in the tax law, as well as
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in regulatory laws. Although there is a strand of thought going back to the Lochner era
that property rights should be immune to invasion by the government, even this body of
thinking provides countless exceptions for public purposes, and in any event has been
repudiated. People hold their property subject to uncertainties created by the
government’s freedom to cause a regulatory transition in every successful market
economy. Thus, the fear of unsettling property rights cannot be a sufficient objection to
restitutionary schemes.
Indeed, restitution programs can be thought of as a just another regulatory
program—like the Endangered Species Act—or transfer program that unsettles property
rights in pursuit of some goal. In both contexts, unsettling of property rights is tolerated
when it is the consequence of a pressing goal, and the goal is circumscribed so that its
achievement will not undermine the market. The Endangered Species Act reduces the
value of investments in land by holding out the risk that it cannot be developed, but it
also promotes environmental protection. To keep its cost at a reasonable level, the
protections created by the Act are circumscribed in a variety of ways. Similarly,
transitional governments always limit restitution programs so that uncertainty about
property rights is kept to a minimum.
These limits are diverse; to mention just a few: (1) some transitional states finance
restitution out of tax revenues so that property owners can expect a full return on their
investment (minus taxes). The choice here is just whether the interference in property
rights should take the form of a small tax on all property or a large confiscatory tax just
on those pieces that are subject to valid claims from earlier owners. In a small,
undeveloped economy risk averse landowners might be reluctant to develop land that
could be subject to a restitution claim. Thus, one might think of government financing of
restitution as a state funded insurance scheme where private insurance markets would
otherwise fail.
(2) Most transitional states refuse to implement fully compensatory restitution and
instead provide partial restitution. These limits on restitution are sometimes overt and
sometimes hidden. A person who lost land now worth $10,000 might get substantially
less because (a) interest or inflation are disregarded, (b) the law places a ceiling on the
value of the claim, (c) costly or time consuming procedures must be endured, or (d) the
value of improvements is subtracted. In Hungary, for example, only claims worth less
than $2,700 fetched full (in nominal terms) compensation; higher claims fetched a
percentage of their value.31 In East Germany, compensation was also less than the full
market value of the land, and took the form of promissory notes rather than cash.32
(3) States limit the destabilizing impact of restitution by imposing procedural
requirements. In Czechoslovakia, as we mentioned, claimants were given only six months
to file their claims.33 After this period all claims would be known and could be liquidated
through private contracts. In eastern Germany the procedures for selling state-owned
property that would be used for investment were initially too cumbersome. The
31
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government sped up the process by eliminating administrative review and allowing the
manager of the property to decide whether the buyer’s investment plan was adequate.34
(4) States also limit restitution by making their restitution programs reflect nonreparative goals as well as reparative goals. Nazi era reparations had a significant
redistributive component: people who lost more received a decreasing fraction of their
loss.35 The Hungarian system provides another example: the fraction of the claim that is
compensated decreases with its size. The government enhances the legitimacy of the
program by increasing the number of its constituents or appealing to norms of distributive
justice.
(5) States reduce uncertainty created by restitution programs by protecting certain
kinds of investments. In many countries, a person who invests in land that is subject to a
restitutionary claim will be able to keep the land; the claimant will be paid out of tax
revenues. In eastern Germany, the government encouraged investment by indemnifying
purchasers of key parcels of land.
Governments in consolidated democracies use these same techniques in order to
limit the adverse impact of domestic transition programs on the market economy. In the
United States, the federal government settles Indian claims by paying cash rather than
allowing tribes to take property that has been developed and settled for decades or more.
Domestic reparations programs almost always pay claims at less than their full value, and
use procedural hurdles and other devices to limit them.36 And there is often a
redistributive component to reparations programs: for example, reparations to JapaneseAmericans interned during World War II was not a function of lost wages or other factors
that could have resulted in a distribution in favor of the wealthy.37
It can be argued that many of the domestic laws mentioned above—adverse
possession, for example—strengthen the market rather than undermining it for the sake of
other goals. Adverse possession and other ownership doctrines trade off two values that
are important for the market: the ability to rely on one’s property not being expropriated,
and the ability to find out quickly and cheaply whether title is clear. Adverse possession
gives the owner an incentive to clarify a claim to property so that third parties who are
eager to invest in a piece of property can learn whether or not someone else already has
an interest in it.
But a similar argument can be made about restitution programs. They have three
market-promoting effects. First, they show a commitment to property rights that
transcends the claims of the state. Rather than permitting the posttransition state and its
citizens to inherit property rights illegitimately expropriated by the prior government, the
restitution program demands that the property go to its original owners. To the extent that
the restitution program shows a strong public commitment to property rights, it will
discourage future governments from expropriating property, for the title held by future
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governments will be vulnerable to subsequent restitution programs. It will also send a
signal to foreign investors of the new regime’s commitment to property rights.
Second, restitution programs limit the discretion of officials in the posttransitional
government, officials who often have an unsavory connection to the pretransitional
government. Pogany misses this point when he argues that posttransitional governments
should sell property to foreign companies that can invest in it.38 A discretionary system
creates opportunities for all kinds of abuses, including corruption and rent seeking. And
the individuals who obtain restitution can always resell their property to foreign investors
and others who can put the property to more productive use.
Third, restitution programs are more likely to extinguish moral and political
pressure against the existing allocation of property rights than allocation schemes that are
apparently more rational. The claims of American Indians create moral and political
pressure even when they are not legally valid, and the states and the federal government
have translated these pressures into legal claims.39 When historical property rights have
more legitimacy than the distribution that exists at the time of transition, restitution
programs channel into the legal system claims that might otherwise destabilize the market
by posing a political threat to the security of posttransitional property rights.
In sum, the appeal to the market cannot by itself resolve the question whether
restitution programs should be used. There are respectable theoretical arguments on both
sides; it is thus an empirical question whether the use of restitution programs eases the
transition to a market economy or interferes with it.
One cannot answer the empirical question with much confidence but the evidence
tends to support the use of restitution. Post-Nazi West Germany has paid by far the most
significant reparations, both in absolute and relative terms. And unlike other
posttransition states, much of the money left the country—to Israel, and to Holocaust
victims who emigrated to other countries. Yet West Germany is surely the most
successful political transition in terms of the distance traversed from the Nazi era to the
postwar era.40 There is no evidence that the massive reparations hindered West
Germany’s economic or political development, and indeed they probably helped West
Germany achieve political normalcy.
The postcommunist Germany of today is burdened with a new restitution system
stemming from the collapse of the GDR and its absorption into a unified German nation.
1.1 million claims have been registered comprising over two million separate
claims to over half the land area of the former GDR. In short, outside agricultural
property, there is very little property in the new Länder which does not have a
restitution claim registered against it, often multiple claims.... In the centre of
Leipzig, 23,000 restitution claims have been registered.41
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Eastern Germany is mired in a depression, and Germany as a whole has a stagnant
economy. But it would be wrong to attribute these problems to the restitution program,
which is dwarfed by the privatization scheme, by the environmental problems left behind
by the GDR, by the wage equalization program, and by the cultural and political tensions
between East and West. Indeed, the claims are being processes steadily, and investment is
where necessary promoted by the Treuhand, a German government agency charged with
privatizing the former GDR economy, which indemnifies developers of lands against
restitution claims.42
Hungary and the Czech Republic also implemented restitution programs, and they
are two of the most successful transitions from the 1989 phase of the third wave. Both
countries are counted among the economic and political success stories: they have
functioning market economies and have highly rated political institutions.43 In the Czech
Republic, where corruption is rife, “[r]estitution was by far the cleanest and most
successful process [among other forms of privatization]. Families immediately started
taking good care of their properties, and towns and cities, especially their older parts,
became beautiful once again.”44 By contrast, fraud and corruption have marred the
voucher program.45 Restitution, by reducing government discretion, limited the
opportunities for corruption. Although it is not clear that restitution is a necessary
condition for transitional success—Poland had no significant restitution program and is
also counted as an economic and political success46—the evidence suggests that
restitution as a form of transitional justice does not interfere with political and economic
transition whether or not it helps with those transitions as well.
Critics of restitution programs might argue that Hungary and the Czech Republic
have achieved political and economic reform only because their restitution programs are
limited. Perhaps this is so, but that only shows that transitional justice does not open a
Pandora’s box, but can be circumscribed like any domestic legal program in light of other
needs and concerns.
Pogany also argues that restitution programs reinforce stereotypes “that certain
national or ethnic groups tend to accumulate unfair or grossly disproportionate wealth.”47
He is talking mainly about Jews, but also about ethnic Germans in Hungary and the
Czech Republic and other groups. This argument also has its domestic analogue: the
claim that welfare programs should be avoided because they stigmatize blacks, for
example. It is also like saying that American Indians should not get land back because
this would cause resentment among other Americans. Neither of these arguments are
respectable: they depend on a speculative causal mechanism, and they are rejected by the
people who are supposedly the victims of the stereotypes.
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C. Retroactive Justice
A dramatic feature of some regime transitions is the retroactive application of new
legal and political norms to conduct occurring under the old regime. In the case of
lustration and purges the retroactivity is civil in character, while in the most dramatic
cases of retroactivity, such as the Danish, Dutch and French laws after 1945 that punished
collaborators with the Nazis or the Vichy regime,48 criminal trials and sentences proceed
under substantive standards that are openly retroactive. In other cases, such as the trial by
reunified Germany of former East German border guards for shooting attempted
escapees, defense counsel claim that only impermissibly retroactive law could make the
conduct illegal. The new regime must then either openly acknowledge retroactivity or
else resort to a variety of legal techniques designed to sidestep or eliminate the
retroactivity problem; we will discuss the possible techniques, and their domestic
analogues, in what follows.
The basic tension that animates these debates is the so-called dilemma of
retroactive justice. The positive law of the old regime often licensed abuses and injustice,
including widespread violations of civil rights and property rights. In many cases those
abuses themselves included retroactive punishment, under the old regime’s norms, of
citizens and officials of the regime that the old regime replaced; consider the treatment of
ancien regime aristocrats in communist polities. Even where the actions of old-regime
officials were crimes under the old regime’s positive law, the relevant statutes of
limitations have often expired. Should the new regime punish the old conduct, assuming
that it has not pledged amnesty or immunity to old leaders during the transition? (Where
such pledges have been made, a further question is whether the new regime has a moral
or prudential obligation to adhere to them after the transition).
The case for retroactive justice need not rest (solely) on a morally disreputable
passion; the popular demand for punishment of officials and collaborators of the old
regime may also rest on considerations that are normatively quite respectable. If
retroactive punishment of old-regime leaders is illiberal, it also responds to standard
retributivist intuitions about appropriate punishment, given that old leaders often violated
liberal rights (as by inflicting retroactive punishment on their predecessors). Punishment
may also have important symbolic and expressive effects; paradoxically, illiberal or
procedurally suspect retroactive punishment may dramatize the new regime’s
commitment to legality and liberal democracy, suggesting in an emphatic way that future
rights-violations will be met with sanctions. Most pragmatically, where a popular passion
for retribution is widespread it is a social datum that the new regime’s policymakers will
have to take into account as they would other facts. To allow the former persecutors to
roam free may effectively encourage unfocused private violence against innocent and
guilty alike. This is just the standard channeling function of legal punishment, which
substitutes public and official process for random vigilantism.
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Against the demand for substantive justice, however, is the competing concern of
procedural legality. In the standard case of transition from a communist or authoritarian
regime to a democratic one, leaders of the new regime want to establish (and to be seen to
establish) a conventional liberal democracy that respects constitutional and international
norms of legality. Prominent among those norms is the concept, which may be specified
through a variety of conceptions, that retroactive punishment violates the rule of law: “no
punishment without law” (nulla poena sine lege) is taken to bar “after the fact” (ex post
facto) sanctions. Opposing the demand for substantive justice, then, is a desire both to
afford procedural legality, and also to be seen to afford it, even to the old regime’s
offenders. Indeed, the refusal to violate procedural legality even to punish those who
previously violated procedural legality may appear noble, as the highest possible
affirmation of the new regime’s liberal commitments.
All this is, in large part, a standard debate about means and ends. Advocates of
retroactive punishment wish to use illiberal means to liberal ends, whereas opponents
argue that liberal ends can only be served through liberal means.49 In practice, however,
this stark moral dilemma is usually not resolved, but finessed. Rather than adopt a
principled and thoroughgoing account that either discards substantive justice in favor of a
“thick line” between past and present, or that discards procedural legality in favor of
retroactive justice, leaders and institutions of the new regime, including the new regime’s
judges, follow a middle course that allows some punishment of old offenders but that
adheres, at least nominally, to the norms of procedural legality. Consider the following
legal techniques for dissolving or circumventing the dilemma:
The appeal to higher preexisting law. In the most difficult cases, as we have seen,
the old regime’s positive law did not prohibit, or affirmatively authorized, the abuses at
issue. An obvious way to dissolve the retroactivity problem is to claim that the old
regime’s positive law was itself subject to, or trumped by, some higher law that existed
throughout the period. In general, three versions of the higher-law appeal are common:
the appeal may lie to preexisting constitutional law, international law, or “natural” law.
In the constitutional-law case, legalists of the new regime will claim that the old
regime never “validly” or “legally” came into existence, so that its positive law was void
from the outset. In the border guards cases, some German constitutionalists advanced the
theory that GDR law was void from the outset because the FRG alone had inherited
sovereignty from the Third Reich (or from the Weimar Republic). Under this theory, the
GDR law to which the border guards pointed to in justification of their acts would have
been invalid. The sticking point here, however, was that the Unification Treaty itself
prohibited the unified government from punishing acts committed in the GDR unless
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those acts were punishable under GDR law.50 And GDR law contained many provisions,
doctrines, and informal norms that might be said to authorize border killings. Although
the GDR code contained standard provisions on murder and manslaughter, the Border
Law of 1982 made it a felony to cross the border without authorization, and said that use
of a weapon to prevent felonies at the GDR border was justified. More generally, the
GDR constitution adverted to a doctrine of “socialist legality,” under which party
directives ordering, in the name of socialist revolution, the killing of attempted escapees
might trump any other provisions of positive law.51
If the appeal to a preexisting constitution fails, a similar technique is the appeal to
preexisting rules or norms of international law. In some cases, this will be higher law that
the old regime itself consented to or approved; consider that the GDR was a signatory to
various international human-rights conventions, including the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Although the Covenant provides an individual
right of exit from any country, including one’s own, and prosecutors argued that this
provision trumped the domestic laws that arguably authorized border killings, GDR law
also held that a treaty had no domestic effect unless implemented by legislation—and the
Covenant never was. In some cases, however, German courts used the Covenant in less
direct fashion to help construct an idealized version of GDR law52 under which the border
guards could be punished. Thus the Federal Supreme Court upheld convictions in borderguards cases on the theory that supra-legal principles of justice and human rights were
themselves implicit in GDR law, and were evidenced by sources such as the Covenant
despite its absence of domestic legal force.
In other cases, the relevant international norms will be mandatory or jus cogens
norms, such as prohibitions on genocide or war crimes; these, of course, were prominent
claims in the Nuremberg prosecutions. Where, however, neither consent-based or
mandatory international law is available or applicable, the appeal to higher legal norms
must be phrased as an appeal to natural law; and of course the conceptual and
jurisprudential boundaries between mandatory jus cogens norms and natural-law norms is
notoriously vague. Apart from Nuremberg, in the most controversial judgment in the
trials of the East German border guards, a German court convicted two guards for
violating “basic human right[s],” despite conceding that the killings were authorized
under GDR law.53 The broad trend since Nuremberg, however, has been to deemphasize
the most direct forms of appeal to natural law in such situations, in part because of the
development of an elaborate vocabulary of international legal norms that serve the same
function, and because the inevitable comparison to the Nazi horrors detailed at
Nuremberg tends to favor defendants charged with lesser abuses.
Taking nominal law seriously. In other cases, a variant of the appeal to higher law
occurs when the new regime’s courts enforce, or extrapolate law from, positive
provisions in the old regime’s code that were strictly nominal -- rarely enforced and
constantly belied by administrative practice. In one border-guard trial, the court eschewed
the natural-law approach and professed strict adherence to the positive law of the GDR.
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But the court construed that positive law not to authorize the border killings, a startling
conclusion given that the GDR government commonly gave the border guards rewards
and official decorations for their actions. The court’s technique was to ignore the “law in
action,” in favor of a straight-faced pretense that the nominal statutory law of the GDR
applied impartially to the guards. To be sure, we have seen that the border guards had a
colorable argument even on this fanciful premise, but the court held that GDR law “did
not require the guards to shoot-to-kill single, unarmed escapees. [The guards] did not
have to shoot [those] who posed no risk to border security, thus failing to meet the
criterion for use of deadly force under communist law.”54 In a similar vein, German legal
theorists have argued that direct orders of party officials, such as orders directing
repression and killing, were not technically law in the GDR, and must be ignored in favor
of strict adherence to the surface meaning of GDR statutes and administrative provisions.
While the appeal to higher law dissolves the retroactivity problem by trumping the
positive authority on which old-regime defendants rely, this approach dissolves it by
claiming that old-regime defendants never had positive authority in the first place unless
that authority was specified in formal sources of law, and in explicit terms.
Interpretive statutes. In the cases we have discussed so far the retroactivity
problem is avoided or dissolved by judicial interpretation of old law or by judicial
identification of trumping higher law. Legislatures may, however, also contribute
pragmatic measures that aim to smooth over the principle-ridden conflict between
retroactive justice and procedural legality. One technique is the enactment of interpretive
statutes, by which legislatures proclaim an understanding that the governing positive law,
despite appearances, never authorized or affirmatively prohibited the relevant acts. In
Belgium after World War II, the narrow scope of the provisions in the penal code
concerning treason, limited essentially to military activities, were widened through
interpretive statutes to encompass less direct forms of collaboration.55
Retroactive extension of statutes of limitations. Another relatively indirect means
by which legislatures may institute retroactive justice is by retroactively extending
statutes of limitations for the prosecution of old crimes. (This technique is, of course,
available only where the old positive law barred or can now be construed to bar the
substantive acts for which old-regime officials or collaborators will be prosecuted). There
are two standard cases. In the first, the statute has not yet expired, and defendants are
reduced to arguing that the new regime is obligated to let the previously-prescribed
limitations period run if it cannot initiate prosecution within that time. In the second case,
which is legally and rhetorically much stronger for defendants, the previous limitation
period has already expired, and defendants will argue that they have a vested immunity
from prosecution. In either case, but most critically in the second, new governments
counter with the argument that the running of the limitations period should be held to
have been tolled by the old regime’s lawless refusal to prosecute its own officials who
violated nominal law on party orders.
Contrasting decisions from the constitutional courts of Czechoslovakia and
Hungary illustrate the dynamics of limitations periods, and the interactions between
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domestic and international law. In both nations, new-regime legislatures enacted
retroactive extensions. The Czech court upheld the measure as a requirement of justice,
while the Hungarian court invalidated it as a violation of procedural legality, even where
the limitations period had not yet already expired. (In the latter respect the decision goes
well beyond American constitutional law, which generally speaking allows retroactive
extension of nonexpired limitations, although not of expired ones). The Hungarian
court’s ruling was, however, softened when the government enacted a new law based on
international conventions that abrogate limitations periods for egregious offenses, such as
war crimes and crimes against humanity.56 The Hungarian court upheld the statute as to
such offenses. In this type of case, the new regime in a sense uses international law, not
directly to trump the old regime’s positive law, but to trump the constitutional protection
of procedural legality in its own newly-enacted constitution.
How should we evaluate these techniques for accomplishing a measure of
retroactive justice, especially in the limit case of retroactive criminal prosecution? Jon
Elster says that “either of the two non-hypocritical positions”—openly avowed
retroactive justice, a la Nuremberg, or else thoroughgoing insistence on procedural
legality—“seem defensible.”57 The techniques we have canvassed for ameliorating the
moral dilemma, however, Elster sees as morally indefensible “subterfuge.” This is a
standard plea for candor and moral transparency, but it overlooks that in consolidated
democracies courts are by no means always candid. Although candor is often praised in
general,58 it remains controversial in particular settings. If this is so, then the candor
argument is orthogonal to the transitional justice question: candor might or might be
desirable, but it cannot be assumed, without argument, that courts doing transitional
justice should be more candid than courts doing ordinary justice. The conceptual mistake
here is to hold courts doing transitional justice to moral standards that would be
unrealistic even for courts in settled liberal democracies.
Moreover, the techniques we have discussed may, on net, promote candor.
Generally, communist and authoritarian regimes frequently try to conceal their abuses
with elaborate lip service to liberal and international human-rights norms—by
subscribing to international conventions (as the GDR did), by maintaining
unimpeachably liberal codes of nominal law, and by professing strict adherence to
universal moral codes. The old regime benefited from the existence of these propaganda
materials, from the divorce between the nominal law of human rights and the brutal de
facto law of party dominance; its officials benefited as well. When the new regime’s
courts ignore the law in action in favor of the nominal law, or treat the old regime’s
international commitments as good-faith obligations, they are merely holding the old
regime to its word. It is hardly clear that, on Elster’s own criteria, candor would be better
served by treating de facto authoritarian power as law, while ignoring the professed
standards for limiting that power that the old regime published, insincerely, to the
world.59
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Finally, Elster is too casual in dismissing as morally impermissible “subterfuge” a
series of techniques that adjust and reconcile the competing claims of justice and legality.
Many of those techniques are not subterfuge at all. In some cases they are best
understood as attempts to identify circumstances that vitiate the moral rationale for the
liberal ban on retroactive punishment. Thus the appeal to international norms weakens
the wrongdoers’ argument that the retroactive punishment comes as an unfair surprise;
international condemnation should put wrongdoers on moral notice. A similar point holds
for retroactive extensions of statutes of limitations, which only apply to those who have,
after all, violated underlying substantive law that was in effect when they violated it;
usually that substantive law will have moral content, as opposed to being a strictly
regulatory offense. In other cases, these techniques are attempts to strike a workable
balance between competing moral intuitions and pragmatic needs. Taking nominal law
seriously reduces the formidable decision costs of identifying the old regime’s “real”
unwritten law; retroactive extensions of statutes of limitations gives new-regime officials
caught up in the transitional tumult breathing space to sort out offenders and establish
priorities among cases that are to be prosecuted.
This sort of conflict-management, as among competing moral and practical
considerations, is hardly unique to transitional-justice situations; unsurprisingly, many
legal systems have developed similar techniques in response to the continual transitions
of lesser degree that occur in the ordinary course. Consider the parallels between the
techniques we have discussed here and the techniques available in American law for
dampening the effects of constitutional prohibitions on retroactivity, such as the Ex Post
Facto Clause (for penal laws) and the Due Process, Contracts and Takings Clauses (for
civil laws and laws affecting property rights).60 In the latter setting, courts accommodate
the competing claims of justice and legality under the doctrinal rubric that retroactivity is
permissible unless “unreasonable,” where reasonableness takes into account the
exigencies that call for retroactive lawmaking.61 Legislatures have often weighed in with
interpretive statutes, and courts have proven receptive to the practice.62 There is also a
domestic parallel to the invocation of higher law to trump the old regime’s positive law.
Suits against federal and state officials for actions authorized by statutory or
administrative law commonly claim that the action violated some capacious or
ambiguous constitutional provision, such as the due process clause; where the court
subsequently finds a violation of that preexisting provision the defendants have no valid
complaint about retroactivity, at least if the later court can claim with a straight face that
the right was “clearly established” when the official acted.63
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Even in the criminal setting, legislatures and courts have ample leeway to adjust
the ex post facto prohibition in pragmatic style. Criminal statutes of limitations may be
retroactively extended so long as the limitations period has not already run.64 In all cases,
strong governmental interests in attaining retroactive justice may be accommodated, in
particular settings, either by declining to describe the prescribed sanctions as “penal,”65 or
by describing the new law as “procedural” rather than substantive;66 either technique
allows the court to hold that the ex post facto prohibition has not been triggered.
The point, of course, is not necessarily to praise any of these doctrines or
decisions. It is to say that these sorts of accommodations are widely used, and are
successful in the minimal, pragmatic sense that they limit the worst abuses of retroactive
justice while permitting powerful social demands for post-hoc adjustments of legal
obligations to find some satisfaction. Any set of moral intuitions that would condemn,
wholesale, pragmatic accommodations of this character should be recalibrated. The moral
objections to these techniques, if there are any, would have to point to unjust
consequences of particular rules and decisions, and would have to operate at retail.
Candor is not the relevant criticism, and the wholesale level of analysis is not the right
level of generality at which to criticize.
Eschewing Elster’s moral critique, Bruce Ackerman argues against retroactive
justice squarely on pragmatic grounds. Stipulating for argument’s sake that retroactive
criminal punishment is morally justifiable in transitional-justice situations, Ackerman
advances imposing institutional objections to retroactive justice. The core problem is that
new regimes enjoy great moral credibility, but possess low bureaucratic capacity. The
legal system of the new regime will often, as we have seen, be staffed principally by
officials selected under the old regime, and that system will be threatened with overload
In light of the costs, the new regime must inevitably select its targets, but any principle of
selection will seem arbitrary and impractical. Prosecutions of high officials are difficult
because their most culpable orders and policies are often left implicit, or simply
unwritten. Prosecutions of low-ranking officials will pose the question whether and when
compliance with superior orders should be exculpatory, and the public will complain if it
appears that the small fish have been punished while the big fish have slipped away.
We will take up a number of these pragmatic questions separately in other
sections. Our global point is that Ackerman has the right premises, but his (apparent)
conclusion that no prosecution should occur amounts to an implausibly extreme solution.
Despite the practical difficulties, the optimal level of prosecutions of old-regime officials
is probably not zero. It is surprisingly rare that new regimes have entirely eschewed
retroactive criminal justice, as did Spain after 1975 and Russia after 1991. The
indisputable need for selection among possible defendants, all of whom are morally
culpable (albeit on varying grounds and to varying degrees), is no fatal objection.
Prosecutors routinely face the same difficulties where their target is a large and
hierarchically-organized conspiracy, such as a drug cartel, or where a large number of
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people commit criminal acts, such as tax evasion. (We return to the issue of selective
prosecution in II.G.1 below). Like Elster, Ackerman has exaggerated the moral and
practical import of problems that are familiar in nontransitional settings and that have
never proved crippling to nontransitional legal systems.67
D. Court Congestion
One stock pragmatic argument against retroactive justice is that prosecutions or
civil proceedings against old-regime officials will tie up the new legal system with
endless backward-looking litigation, rather than the tasks of building a new regime. The
argument reaches beyond retroactive justice in the sense of sanctions, to include
lustration schemes that, as in Czechoslovakia, provide for judicial review at the behest of
accused collaborators, and also schemes of reparation or compensation administered by
the courts. As Clause Offe puts it, “after the demise of the old regime, and confronted
with the chaos it has left behind, we have more important things to care about than
retroactive justice. Formal court procedures are costly, and the professional manpower
used in them is more urgently needed for other purposes.”68
Although this is not, perhaps, the most prominent or important of the pragmatic
arguments for the “thick line,” we focus on it because it illustrates very cleanly the
impulse that animates opponents of retroactive justice. The impulse is to look forward
rather than back; retroactive justice, and transitional justice generally, is seen as a waste
of institutional resources compared to the tasks of regime-building. It should, by now, be
obvious that this view assumes away, rather than answering, the argument for retroactive
justice, lustration, and compensation. Those tools can always be given, and always do
receive, a forward-looking justification as well as a backward-looking one. Proponents of
transitional measures rarely rest content with appealing to retributivism or the lex
talionis. Retroactive justice is said to be necessary to legitimate the new regime, and to
dampen private violence; lustration is justified as a prophylactic measure ensuring that
the new regime will be staffed by supporters, not crypto-reactionaries; and restitution or
reparations are needed to level the playing field, providing victims useable equivalents
for their lost human capital and preventing old-regime collaborators from using their illgotten endowments to achieve disproportionate success in the new order.
There is no way to cash out the court-congestion argument without assuming
away such points. Once they are admitted, the congestion “problem” simply becomes
another (forward-looking) policy problem that the new regime must face. Supposing the
judicial system’s capacity to be constant, the systemic effect of adding a new raft of
transitional-justice proceedings will be to displace some set of ordinary legal disputes by
shunting them to the back of the court queue. This is a loss only if the displaced
proceedings would have made greater net contributions to the new regime’s future
welfare than the transitional-justice proceedings; otherwise it is a straightforward benefit.
If the judicial system’s capacity is not constant, then the question simply concerns the
opportunity cost of the resources necessary to expand it (to accommodate the transitional
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proceedings). The regime’s problem is just to pick the forward-looking projects with the
best social returns; the reference to congestion is doing no independent work.
Here too, there is an illuminating parallel to debates within nontransitional legal
systems, in this case stock debates about the creation of new causes of action.69
Opponents will complain that new causes of action will open the floodgates of litigation,
swamping courts; proponents will point to the valuable compensatory and deterrent
effects of the new suits. As in the transitional case, the real question is just the relative
social-welfare contributions of the new lawsuits and those they would displace. The
parallelism of the two debates fails in one respect, however. No one in the domestic case
claims that the legal system should ignore all past wrongdoing and focus on “future
business,” perhaps because of the prominence of forward-looking considerations, such as
deterrence, as a justification for ordinary tort liability. As we have seen, however, every
type of transitional-justice measure also has important forward-looking justifications,
albeit more subtle ones. Once that is recognized, it becomes clear that the congestion
objection, and similar claims, are merely institutional makeweights.
E. Destruction of Reputations
One reason for drawing a thick line between past and present is that the past is so
corrupt, and seems to implicate all but a few brave dissenters and perhaps even them as
well.70 Nearly all people collaborated in their own enslavement, and if there are
gradations of guilt, they are too difficult to distinguish after the transition, for the past
seems like a bad dream, and can no longer be understood. Eager to keep the past at bay,
critics of transitional justice emphasize the risks it poses to the reputations of those who
are needed to move society forward.
These criticisms focus on the Czech lustration law, which was the first in eastern
Europe and has been imitated in Hungary, Poland, and other countries. Eastern Germany
is a special case: hundreds of thousands of state employees were simply fired by the
government of newly unified Germany, and replaced by western Germans—an option not
available to other transitional states, which had to draw on their own ranks. In eastern
Germany, Stasi files were made available to the people who were spied on; revelations in
these files ended the careers of many prominent eastern Germans including intellectual
and reformers.71 Back in the Czech Republic, complaints surfaced about the operation of
the lustration law. A well known book by Lawrence Wechsler documents the torments of
Jan Kavan (whom Wechsler stylishly calls “Jan K.”), a former dissident whose life and
political career were thrown into turmoil after he was accused of collaborating with the
old regime.72
In the course of a wide ranging critique of lustration and related disqualification
laws, as he calls them, Offe makes a number of points about their reputational effects.
First, “[g]overnments may become addicted to witch-hunting or scapegoating, and may
resort to ever more indiscriminate use of such practices as a solution to all kinds of
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political problems.”73 Second, “[t]he practice of disqualification may ... provide
individuals with opportunities to exploit the sanctioning potential of the state as a private
weapon or means of blackmail. [Individuals have] the opportunity ... to give—false or
accurate—testimony as to some fellow citizen’s role in the old regime, or to withhold
accurate testimony and thereby extract some profit through blackmail.”74 Third, there
might arise “ a thoughtless habit—or, alternatively, a consciously designed hidden
agenda—of personalizing the nature of the regime itself, and by implication of
whitewashing all those whose names are not listed in the official files on members, office
holders or informers—all of which might amount to an obstacle to coming to terms with
the past in an adequate, fair and critical way.”75 Fourth, secret police records are never
complete, and often contain inaccuracies, some of them created by departing officers
intent on concealing their own trail and casting suspicion on their enemies.76 Fifth,
Former informers will ... have to face the indefinite uncertainty that some of their
victims will find out about their activities and respond by private means of
revenge and/or public denunciation, which in turn may motivate informers to
form protective networks among themselves and to put their inside knowledge to
strategic use.77
What concerns Offe is the delicacy of reputation, and its special potential for abuse in
transitional societies, where one’s reputation as a collaborator or dissident has
tremendous significance, and where nearly everyone is tainted.
Lustration involves the administrative or judicial determination that a person
collaborated with the old regime. The punishment is exclusion from office and usually
public exposure. Because collaboration was not a crime in the old regime, the
administrative or judicial determination involves the making of moral judgments about a
person’s conduct. In Germany, for example, eastern German civil servants were
dismissed if they violated the “principles of humanity or the rule of law,” including rights
and principles contained in international conventions.78 This, as well as its possible
stigmatizing effect, is the element of lustration that bothers critics.79
But this element plays an important role in domestic law as well. To see the
continuity between lustration and domestic law, imagine that a person has done
something shameful but not illegal. (Often, as Trent Lott’s downfall illustrates, the prior
behavior was not shameful at the time but became shameful after social norms changed.)
Disclosure of the shameful act would harm the person by alerting employer, spouse, and
friends of the misdeed. This person is in a position similar to that of the person who
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collaborated with a pretransitional regime. In both cases the only thing that stands
between the status quo and ruin is public ignorance about the past deed. In both cases, we
might imagine, some people know about the past deed, and perhaps rumors about it
circulate as well.
The law recognizes that the disclosure of this information produces benefits and
harms. It harms the individual who committed the shameful deed but it also benefits
people who are provided more accurate information about the person’s character. If the
earlier act involved dishonesty and betrayal, the employers, spouses, and friends might,
by shunning the person, avoid being the victim of future bad acts. Although a strain of
thought holds that more information is always better, the law takes a more complex view
that recognizes that information is often misused. People overreact rather than engage in
Bayesian updating; they herd; they stigmatize; they scapegoat; they use a person’s
humiliation as a means for setting off their own virtuous characters. To avoid shame and
humiliation, people might prospectively avoid taking desirable risks or, having made a
youthful mistake, avoid public positions where they could be exposed. There is a kind of
Mayor of Casterbridge effect: the incentive to take risks is reduced by the possibility that
the reward for success will be eliminated as the result of exposure of a past misdeed. Offe
suggests more darkly that these people would also group together and pose a threat to the
new regime, just as those who were (literally) branded as outlaws in early modern
England would form criminal gangs living outside the reach of law.80
And yet this problem is hardly unknown in domestic law. Individuals constantly
run the risk that their past misdeeds will catch up with them. We see politicians hounded
out of office when their earlier statements and deeds are disclosed to the public. A whole
industry devotes itself to maintaining records of defaults on debts of ordinary people, and
another industry offers to dig up the past of anyone for a fee. In trials, character evidence
can be used in certain circumstances, with the result that a person’s legal guilt might be
based in part on legal but morally improper behavior. And domestic truth commissions in
consolidated democracies are tolerated despite the damage done to reputations.81 None of
this is to suggest that stigma is not a problem. Privacy laws enable people to keep certain
facts hidden from view; credit reporting laws restrict disclosure of defaults and
bankruptcies; expungement laws erase criminal records or limit access to them; blackmail
laws discourage disclosure of shameful information by limiting its value as a bargaining
chip; defamation laws recognize the importance of a clean reputation; and all kinds of
constitutional doctrines and statutes prevent discrimination on the basis of traditionally
stigmatizing conditions such as illegitimacy. But these laws, by restricting only some
uses of information about a person’s past, show the extraordinary value of information
when it is accurate and not abused.
These domestic laws and lustration laws are all devices for clarifying the past:
privacy law permits one to conceal those parts of one’s past that are not of great
relevance to the present; lustration law forces one to reveal those parts of one’s past that
are of great relevance to the present. Privacy law does not generally enable individuals to
conceal embarrassing but relevant portions of their past; lustration law does not force
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individuals to reveal the embarrassing but irrelevant portions of their past. The main
difference between the laws is that lustration ferrets out hidden but significant
information while privacy laws conceal information that might otherwise be discovered,
but this difference is easily explained by the different background legal regimes. Privacy
laws exist in open societies where people can find out anything about anybody; lustration
laws exist in posttransitional regimes coming after regimes where nobody (except the
government) could find out anything about anybody. Some institutional bootstrapping is
needed to convert the closed society into the open society. It is not enough to remove
censorship restrictions if much of the information that would be freely available in an
open society cannot be obtained with the subpoena and other forms of legal coercion.
Seen in this light, the concerns that lustration laws cause special unjustifiable
harms to reputation are overwrought. Lustration, like any civil or criminal trial, will harm
the reputation of a person who is found to have engaged in wrongful conduct. This
particular reputational harm is generally seen as unobjectionable in domestic law: but if
people are likely to overreact, domestic law, as we have seen, provides devices like
expungement or antidiscrimination rules to limit the long-term harm. Lustration, like any
civil or criminal trial, might also harm the reputation of a person who is found not to have
engaged in wrongdoing. But here again the same is true about ordinary criminal and civil
procedures: an arrest that does not lead to trial or conviction can nonetheless stigmatize.
Lustration laws do not always involve individualized determinations. In many
cases, a broad class of persons is prohibited from holding high offices on the ground that
anyone who belongs to that class poses a threat to the new regime. Individuals in this
class have no right to show that they do not pose a threat, or their right is heavily
circumscribed and offered few procedural protections. The initial Czechoslovak lustration
law, for example, barred all communist officials and collaborators from holding posts in
the government and various government agencies, the military, the courts, the
universities, and business owned by the state. Appeal was permitted, but there was, in
effect, a presumption of guilt.82 Indeed, the post-World War II denazifaction laws created
by the allies put the burden of proof on the defendant to show misclassification.83
There are due process concerns, as we discuss elsewhere, but the important point
is that deliberately overbroad prophylactic bans on officeholding will not damage
reputations as much as individualized determinations. The person who falls under the ban
can claim to be the special case that the overinclusive rule did not account for. Indeed, if
a person is already known to have belonged to the proscribed class—as an official in the
prior government, for example—the lustration does not injure reputation at all. It simply
ratifies what is already known. So critics of lustration are inconsistent: they worry about
harm to individual reputations but appeal to due process norms to bar more rule-based
lustration schemes that would minimize reputational harm.84
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Turning to the evidence, one does find anecdotal evidence about reputational
harm in transitional societies but we have found no systematic account of the actual
damage done. On the contrary, observers confirm that the laws have not caused
widespread disruption or injustice of the kind that was predicted.85 Jan Kavan was
eventually cleared by a court, and he was elected to a seat in Parliament. Although he had
to endure many painful years of uncertainty, that is true about anyone who is prosecuted
under the law, and there seems to have been ample reason to be suspicious of him even if
ultimately not enough to justify purging him from government.
A fine natural experiment is provided by Czechoslovakia, which enacted harsh
lustration laws in 1991. These laws were inherited by the Czech Republic but not
Slovakia when the two nations split. “[T]here is no doubt that [the lustration law] did
keep a number of highly compromised persons out of public life in Czech lands, while
such persons remained to do much damage in Slovakia.”86 Indeed, these persons
reestablished an authoritarian regime in Slovakia, one that has only recently begun to
thaw, while in the Czech Republic the transition to a liberal democracy has been smooth
and steady.87 In Poland there was initially no lustration law but after a series of scandals
involving high officials who were believed to have been collaborators—one such scandal
caused the fall of the government—a lustration law was created in 1998.88 The optimistic
view there that a thick line could be drawn between present and past was initially
supported by the public but has since been repudiated, and the new lustration law enjoys
popularity.89 The other success stories—the former GDR and Hungary—also enacted
lustration laws, although after much delay and milder than the Czech Republic’s. By
contrast, the failures and partial failures—Russia and its satellites—had no significant
lustration laws. This pattern must disappoint those who believed that Spain’s smooth
purge-free transition would provide the model for the successful transitions after 1989.
But this just shows that what works in one country might not work in another.
The critics underestimated the importance of exposing collaborators and
removing them from political life. They did not see that these people could do harm, that
their presence would demoralize the public who would demand that they be removed.
They did not see that however unpopular the communist parties were at the time of
rupture, they or their successors could draw on sizeable resources and networks in order
to make a comeback. All of this is now well known. What is less well understood is that
the critics exaggerated the reputational consequences of lustration because they did not
see the parallels between lustration and the treatment of reputation under domestic law.
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F. Measurement Problems
A common complaint about transitional justice is that the laws rely on morally
arbitrary distinctions. Critics of restitution programs, for example, point out that these
programs always seem to exclude claims that are as strong as those that are included. The
Holocaust restitution program excluded Gypsies and homosexuals—but both groups were
murdered in large numbers just like the Jews. The Czech restitution program focused on
victims of communism after 1948—when the communist dictatorship came into
existence—but therefore excluded the claims of ethnic German and Hungarian citizens
whose property was confiscated between 1945 and 1948. Jews who lost property during
World War II were also initially excluded but after an amendment the restitution program
was extended to Jews who lost property prior to 1948, but this, of course, excluded other
people who lost property prior to 1948.90 The Hungarian restitution program similarly
favored ethnic Hungarians at the expense of ethnic Germans and (initially) Jews.91
Critics also argue that restitution programs are unjust because they draw morally
arbitrary distinctions within the class of beneficiaries. Elster argues that a factory owner
and an ordinary worker both suffer under communism: the first loses his factory, the
second loses his right to sell his labor. It is unjust that restitution programs typically grant
compensation to the factory owner but not to the worker.92 Cepl argues that reparations
“cannot restore lost careers, opportunities, health and lives” and therefore should be
discarded in favor of forward looking reforms.93 Offe argues similarly that restitution
does not correspond in any sense to criteria of need, past or future achievement, or
to standards of equal citizenship rights. Instead it usually implies a redistribution
at the expense of those members of the present generation who receive no
compensation, and also at the expense of future generations who are deprived of
either the privatization proceeds or access to restored pieces of private property.94
Because restitution leaves less wealth available to people who were never victims, but are
likely to be poorer than those who lost valuable property, it violates principles of
distributive justice.
These criticisms encompass two distinct ideas The first is a technical idea about
implementation. Suppose that we agree that people who suffered under communism
should receive special compensation. We might still object to restitution because
measurement problems will result in a compensation system that is worse than no
compensation system at all. It might be worse because decisions costs are greater than the
benefits, or because it is a lottery—with those who happen to have lost a factory
receiving more money than those who were deprived of an education.
The second idea is disguised as a concern about implementation but is in fact a
critique of the goal of restitution. Offe thinks that because restitution programs by design
have distributive consequences that favor people who lost property, they cannot use need
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as the sole or main criterion. But this is hardly an objection to them. Because the tort
system is designed to deter accidents or provide compensation or punish wrongful
conduct, it also cannot use need as the main criterion for awarding damages. To the
extent that deterrence and compensation are worthy goals, then undesirable redistribution
is simply something that must be tolerated, and then only if it cannot be mitigated
through the tax and transfer system. Similarly, if restitution is a sufficiently worthy goal,
then its redistributive effects cannot be the exclusive concern. No one argued that
reparations for Japanese-American internees in the United States were unjustified
because the money given to former internees would have provided greater value to the
poor.
Back to the first idea. In the American tort system, victims of wrongful acts
usually have a claim for compensation. Measurement error is a concern in some cases but
not others. Courts easily determine damages when property with a market value is
damaged or destroyed; courts can only with difficulty determine damages when property
without a market value is damaged or destroyed, and when health and freedom are lost.
In the long history of tort law one finds different approaches to valuation problems.
Sometimes no harm is recognized or a harm is recognized but no damages (or nominal
damages) are awarded: this was once true for death, pain and suffering, emotional
distress, and some harms to reputation. More frequently in modern tort law damages are
awarded but with the candid recognition that they are likely to be too high or too low but
better than nothing. No one argues that the entire tort system should be thrown out
because torts against property are more likely to result in accurate damage awards than
torts against health or reputation. Then why should a similar argument be made about
posttransitional restitution programs?
Another, and more direct, domestic analogy to restitution is the taking. As we
noted earlier, government takings are transitions, albeit of a humble kind, and takings
jurisprudence reflects the same problems about measurement. As a result of measurement
problems, a homeowner receives the market value of the house that is taken, not its actual
subjective value, which would be economically correct given the goal of compensation.
And because of measurement problems, apparently morally arbitrary distinctions seem to
be drawn: one homeowner receives compensation for property taken by the government,
but another homeowner receives no compensation when a military base is shut down,
even if the loss in property value is identical.
Courts and legislatures also encounter many difficult and often wrenching
decisions about how to allocate rights and entitlements in the first place. The question
whether the Czech restitution program should have covered claims beginning in 1948, or
1945, or 1939, or any other year is just like the question whether the U.S. government
should have compensated victims of the Oklahoma City Bombing as well as the victims
of the World Trade Center attack.95 Offe’s concern that restitution favors people who lost
significant assets mirrors the present day concern that compensation of the 9/11
dependents favors people whose spouses had generous salaries.96 The responses to
concerns like these are intricate and evolving, but no one takes the view that because
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morally arbitrary lines will be drawn, payments should never be made to victims of
government policies or terrorist attacks.
Or consider the frequent use of amnesties, pardons, and grants of clemency. These
backward looking devices unavoidably require difficult moral choices. They draw lines
between groups of people who might have equally valid claims for relief, and they
always penalize, in a comparative way, those who chose not to break the law in the first
place. But amnesties and these other acts serve important functions, and are used despite
discomfort about arbitrary line-drawing.
Our claim, then, is that measurement problems and similar concerns about
arbitrariness in the distribution of benefits do not distinguish transitional justice from
ordinary justice. That transitional justice requires morally troublesome line-drawing and
crude circumventions of measurement problems that result in wealth redistribution that
might conflict with other norms or ideals, does not distinguish posttransitional restitution
programs from numerous popular and morally unobjectionable domestic laws.
G. The Difficulties of Judgment
We have mentioned the reluctance felt among some people about judging those
who supported authoritarian regimes. Four arguments recur. (1) Perpetrators were not the
instigators of crimes, but only followed orders, or were coerced into participation. (2)
They were driven by genuine ideological conviction, or, conversely, were at worst
opportunists who did not share the evil ideological motives of their leaders. (3) They did
what they could to soften the regime’s policies from time and time, and did not resign
because their replacement would be even worse. (4) The sheer quantity of morally
compromised people renders futile any effort to assign gradations of blame: “The past is
another country” and people’s behavior under an authoritarian regime cannot be
evaluated objectively by those living in a liberal state.
For the critics, although each of these reasons might have more or less force in
individual cases, taken as a group they suggest that transitional justice is futile. Because it
is too difficult to make the proper moral distinctions necessary for justice to be done, the
project of transitional justice should be abandoned. Havel’s argument that nearly
everyone was implicated in the crimes of the Czechoslovakian communist government is
just one example.97 Havel’s view seems too broad, and was rejected by the Czech public:
there are clear differences between ordinary people and those with power. Among the
latter group, people should have either worked for reform or quit and joined the ranks of
the powerless. As another example, Elster and others think that people in the first
group—the perpetrators and chief beneficiaries of the old regime—can be judged
differently. Some bear greater guilt than others. This view is surely correct, but the
conclusion that they draw from it—that the moral distinctions are too hard to make, and
therefore that punishment cannot be justified—is clearly wrong.
1. Relative culpability and prosecutorial discretion
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One constellation of excuses offered by officials of the old regime, or citizens
who collaborated with the regime, involves pointing to another (potential) defendant
whose culpability is greater. Commonly the defendant will claim that he was merely
following the orders of a superior authority, that he was at most a passive actor who
acquiesced in others’ unjust actions. In the extreme case, the claim is that the superior
authority would have killed or imprisoned the defendant for not carrying out the unjust
commands, or for resisting; in such circumstances, the argument runs, there is no moral
obligation to undertake heroic measures of resistance, even if heroic resistance would
have been morally praiseworthy. In all these versions, the excuse of relative culpability is
accompanied by a complaint about the arbitrariness of selective prosecution. Why should
some be punished when others, perhaps because of a fortuitous dearth of evidence, go
free—especially when those others are more culpable?
We need to disentangle these complaints. Taken separately, each is unimpressive,
and it is not clear that their conjunction is any more successful. One complaint is that
“[d]isparities in chance survival of evidence will tie one individual [to a crime], while his
comrade—with the same assignment, the same unit, and probably the same degree of
guilt -- will walk away free, because the evidence as to him happened to be
insufficient.”98 But this is trivially true of any nontransitional criminal-justice system.
The requirement that there be evidence creates a risk of false negatives, cases in which
the guilty go free for lack of proof; the requirement also minimizes false positives, and is
presumably worth the costs. The possibility of moral luck is neither here nor there. One
bank robber happened to face the hidden camera and gets twenty-five years; the other,
who faced away from it, gets a hung jury or a favorable plea bargain. The first robber
may well curse the fates, but he has no moral or legal grievance that any justice system
would recognize.
But in fact the new regime’s transitional prosecutors will not even prosecute all
those against whom a case could be made, given the evidence; to make things worse, they
will often prosecute defendants who can plausibly argue that those not prosecuted are
more culpable than they. The problem with the defendants’ complaint, and the parallel
criticisms of transitional justice, is that the new regime’s prosecutors are not in the
business of assessing moral desert, any more than are the prosecutors of consolidated
democracies. State officials use the criminal justice system as a tool of social control, and
must constantly compromise the moral merits of particular cases in order to achieve
systemic aims.
To return to our example of a large, hierarchically-organized drug cartel: who is
morally more culpable, the kingpin who organizes distribution, or the mule who sells the
product? The answer is not obvious, but neither is it particularly important, relative to the
criminal justice system’s other goals. At the level of law enforcement policy, prosecutors
may offer plea bargains to low-level conspirators to obtain evidence against the kingpins,
or may offer the kingpins a deal if they will reveal all of the cartel’s personnel and
methods. Actual trials may focus on kingpins, but they may also, or instead, focus on the
small fry, because the issues of proof are typically less complicated in the latter cases.
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To get the kingpins, prosecutors may resort to indirection, charging them with
lesser crimes, or satellite crimes, that are more easily proved. Erich Mielke, the GDR
head of state security, was prosecuted on an outstanding murder charge dating back to
1934; Harry Tisch, a trade unionist and GDR insider, was convicted of using union funds
to rebuild his weekend house. These results outrage the critics of transitional justice, for
unclear reasons. Al Capone went to prison for tax evasion, not racketeering.99 What
utilitarian calculus, or what deontological constraint, suggests that it would have been
better had he remained free? To be sure, the first-best outcome, in any of these cases,
would be a prosecution on retributively appropriate charges. But where proof of those
charges fails, the best second choice is prosecution on the lesser charge.
At the level of constitutional law, all this is perfectly acceptable. Courts—
transitional or nontransitional—will adopt a hands-off policy, so long as the principle of
selection is not independently invidious (racist or vindictive, using the latter term in the
narrow legal sense of punishment for an earlier assertion of legal rights).100 Subject to the
ordinary requirements of proof and guilt, nontransitional courts do not set the criminally
guilty free merely because some third party, not (yet) prosecuted, was also criminally
guilty; nor do they allow defendants who are guilty of both a lesser charge and a greater
charge to go free just because the government brought the lesser charge alone. Here, as
elsewhere, the critics of transitional justice are guilty of moral perfectionism: they want
the courts of transitional regimes to sift through moral imponderables in ways that courts
in ordinary times never do, and that nobody thinks it is reasonable to demand.
The parallels to transitional-justice settings are striking, although obvious. The
GDR regime might well be seen as just a very large criminal conspiracy. Post-unification
prosecutors and courts convicted some of the border guards from the Berlin Wall, as we
have seen; the sentences were typically light, and carefully graded to factual assessments
of culpability. The top echelon of GDR leaders were also prosecuted, although several,
like Honecker himself, were subsequently excused on grounds of ill health. The large
middle ranks of GDR officials, those who neither directed ultimate policies nor ever
pulled the trigger, have largely gone unmolested, although most are unemployed and, in
competition with highly skilled FRG administrators, unemployable. These outcomes of
the reunified government’s transition-management policies strike us as reasonable ones,
or at least not clearly immoral or imprudent ones, given resource constraints on courts
and prosecutors and the competing costs and benefits of leniency and severity.
Ackerman gives Argentina as an example of a failed campaign of prosecution.101
There the leftist Alfonsin government’s efforts to bring Peronist military officers to
justice resulted in convictions of five of the top echelon, but repeated rebellions by midlevel army officers forced Alfonsin to recognize a defense of “due obedience” to superior
orders, sharply restricting the class of eligible defendants. His Peronist successor Carlos
Menem quashed the remaining cases, pardoned the convicted, and turned from
punishment to reparations, obtaining a sweeping compensation law for victims and their
relatives. Pace Ackerman, all this shows nothing about transitional prosecutions in
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particular, as opposed to either nontransitional prosecutions or other transitional
measures. All it shows is that where new regimes are relatively weak, old-regime
elements, such as the army, may retain enough political muscle to block attempted
punishment, or lustration, or any other measures that impose direct costs. The reparations
program, by contrast, succeeded because it did not encroach on the autonomy of the oldregime military. The political situation may constrain the new regime’s choices, but this
is not a normative argument for, or against, any transitional measure that is within the
politically feasible set.
If the defense of superior orders includes the claim that disobedience would have
been punished harshly, it resolves into a claim of duress. This is the best claim for old
regime defendants, precisely because it is universally recognized, in some form or
another, by nontransitional courts in consolidated democracies. The remaining questions
are largely empirical. Although transitional courts face difficult normative questions if a
medium degree of duress is present, many easy cases will lie at one polar extreme or
another. In the West German prosecutions of Nazi officers, the duress claim was
frequently made and just as frequently rejected, on factual grounds. “[D]espite intensive
defense efforts not one instance could be conclusively established where any German was
punished—even moderately—for refusing or circumventing participation in [Nazi]
atrocities.”102
Elster tries to complicate this picture in two ways.103 The first is to posit that oldregime officials might have had a subjective (albeit empirically ungrounded) belief that
they would be punished for disobedience. But this has nothing to do with transitional
justice; the issue is equally important, or unimportant, for nontransitional duress
claims.104 The second complicating question is whether it makes a difference if the
victims of the victim of duress would have been harmed in any event, by someone else,
had the victim of duress not harmed them.105 Here the point seems to be that the added
counterfactual deepens the moral problems, whatever the law’s response.106 Doubtless
that is so; ethical casuistry feeds off similar hypotheticals.107 But the retreat to the safe
ground of moral theory deprives the question of any importance for transitional justice.
As far as the law is concerned, if A credibly threatens to injure B unless B injures C, B is
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excused for injuring C whether or not A would have injured C (as well as B) had B
refused. Nontransitional courts are not in the business of moral casuistry; no more should
be expected of transitional courts.
2. Ideology and opportunism
Ideology was invoked as an excuse with great success by former Nazi judges in
criminal trials conducted by West German authorities after 1950. The former judges, who
imposed the death penalty on Jews, dissidents, and other undesirables, argued that they
did not have a criminal motive. The motive was not profit or advancement or bloodlust
but serving the Nazi regime in which they believed with all their heart.108 After 1989,
efforts to prosecute officials of the former authoritarian states ran into similar problems.
The spy chief of East Germany had, as a spy chief, the same mens rea as the never
punished spy chief of West Germany: an ideological commitment to serving the state. To
obtain jail time for the East German, prosecutors sought to tie him to a murder that
occurred sixty years earlier.109
Ideology is not a defense in criminal cases in domestic courts, though it is
relevant to determining the degree of culpability and the severity of the punishment.
Jonathan Pollard, for example, argued that his motive for spying on the United States was
the security of Israel, not pecuniary compensation from his handlers.110 Although the
courts rejected this argument without commenting on its legal implications, it is clear that
Pollard’s lawyers through that ideological motivation would not be as severely punished
as pecuniary motivation. This assumption is also reflected in the use of pecuniary motive
as an aggravating factor in capital sentencing.111 Similarly, we regard robbers as ordinary
criminals unless they use their takings to finance a revolution or ideological crusade, in
which case they might be regarded, if caught, as political prisoners subject to special
rules.
There are moral and practical reasons for punishing opportunists more severely
than ideologues. The motive of opportunists is their own self-interest, and that can never
be an excuse for committing a moral wrong. The motive of ideologues is not self-interest,
or not purely self-interest: it is usually a vision of a better society. When that vision is
attractive, we condemn the means but not the ends. The opportunist, by contrast, can be
blamed both for using illegal means and for having selfish ends. But ideology is not
always a mitigating factor. When the vision is abhorrent, then the ideologue is worse than
the opportunist. Hitler was worse than the many opportunists who filled the Nazi party. It
is thus not surprising that sometimes an act motivated by ideology fetches a higher
sanction than an opportunistic act, and sometimes a lower sanction. It is important only to
point out that these moral distinctions and practical concerns are not difficult in general,
even if they might be in certain cases, and courts make them every day. For this reason,
we disagree with critics of transitional justice who argue that because it is difficult to
decide whether an opportunist or an ideologue deserves the greater punishment, officials
and collaborators of the old regime should not be tried.
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There is a related, but slightly different, exculpatory argument that the milieu or
culture of the old regime made the defendant ignorant of the oppressive effects of the
regime’s policies, or morally insensitive to them.112 Domestic law confronts the same
problem when defendants in criminal cases use the excuse of cultural relativism. The
defendant argues that it was excusable for him to carry an illegal knife because he is a
Sikh, and everyone he knows does it;113 or to kiss children’s’ genitals, because that is
what is done in Afghanistan;114 or to take private vengeance on a wrongdoer, because in
Vietnam everyone knows that the authorities cannot be trusted.115 Courts and prosecutors
sometimes recognize the force of these arguments and reduce the charge or the
punishment, but no one thinks that cultural relativism is always or even usually
exculpatory. Individuals with exotic cultural backgrounds have a duty to familiarize
themselves with the laws and norms of the country to which they immigrate. Skepticism
about the claims of individuals who do not is similar to the skepticism we feel about the
claims of perpetrators and collaborators of a past authoritarian regime. Most individuals
in authoritarian societies are capable of looking at their regime critically. A gray area
corresponds to the domestic cultural relativism cases where the illegal act is not
particularly harmful and the cultural distance is great, but for sufficiently wrongful
behavior the claim that the defendant did not have the proper mental state will not be
credible.
3. The “Schindler’s List” defense116
Another standard excuse offered by old-regime officials is that they worked
within the system to ameliorate its worst injustices, or even to covertly sabotage its
operation. Resignation from office, the argument runs, might have salved the official’s
conscience, but would have produced bad consequences for the resistance or opposition.
The replacement might have been a fanatic adherent of the old regime’s evil ideology,
whereas the reluctant official can soften the harsh edges of the old regime’s unjust
directives. Here is a typical example of the argument:
In France during the German occupation, only one judge refused to take the oath
to Petain. Many argued that it should be taken ‘since the alternative was to see
captured resistants come before a judiciary even more Petainized than it already
was. . . . Frequently it had been a question of passing an unjust sentence short of

112

See Offe, supra note __ at 102-03.
See People v. Singh, 516 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1987).
114
See State v. Karger, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996).
115
See Ha v. Alaska, 892 P.2d 184 (Ct. App. 1995). For overviews of the cultural-defense issue, see Jeremy
Waldron, 59 Wash & Lee L Rev 3 (2002); Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture and
Crime: Karger and the Existing Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 829 (1999).
116
Oskar Schindler participated in the Nazi regime by providing industrial goods to the military. But when
the Nazis informed Schindler in the autumn of 1944 that Jewish workers were about to be "relocated,"
Schindler bribed and cajoled the military into allowing him to move his plant. This newly moved plant was
deliberately designed to produce defective military material while it funneled profits to the Resistance. See
Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists, 9 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 173 (1995).
Thanks to Eric Truett for this comparison.
113

43

death lest the case—of future cases—be taken out of the judge’s hand and put in
those of a Vichy fanatic.’117
The difficulties of assessing such an argument are seemingly formidable. The
excuse is self-serving if offered to avoid prosecution or purgation by the new regime;
should it then be discounted? Should some sort of discount be applied as well for the
empirical uncertainties that afflict this excuse? For one thing, perhaps it is not clear that
the meliorist official would have been replaced by a fanatic. For another, perhaps it
would be better for the cause of resistance in the long term, though not for individual
defendants in the short term, if only the fanatical judges are deciding cases; the increased
injustice might spur international condemnation or increased domestic resistance. Most
generally, if the old regime is evil, should resignation from its offices and (perhaps)
participation in the resistance be understood as deontological duties,118 not to be excused
by even the most convincing showing that the consequences of overt resistance would be
worse?
The more we poke at these problems, however, the less formidable they appear.
We have seen that one of the collaborator’s stock excuses—“if I hadn’t done it I would
have been punished”—is just the criminal-law defense of duress transposed to the
transitional-justice context. The philosophical conundrums surrounding duress are indeed
formidable, but the legal system finesses or ignores the conundrums in fine pragmatic
style.
All this holds true as well of the Schindler’s List defense. Here the domestic
analogue is the defense (technically it is a justification, not an excuse) of necessity or the
choice of evils, under which defendants argue that committing one crime is necessary in
order to produce a greater good or avoid a greater harm. Consider the Schindleresque
claim at issue in State v. Green,119 in which one of the participants in a multi-party
criminal conspiracy claimed that he elected to participate in order to prevent harm to his
son, also a conspirator. For tactical reasons the unwilling participant was never tried, but
the court stipulated that, had he been on trial, it would properly have instructed the jury
on duress and necessity.
Defenses of this sort are not common in domestic settings, in part because many
jurisdictions require that the defendant have had no legal alternatives to the crime
charged, or have exhausted those alternatives; calling the police is usually a better option
than meliorist participation in a conspiracy. This requirement might be thought a decisive
disanalogy between the transitional-justice version of the necessity defense and the
domestic version. After all, by hypothesis the old regime dominated the institutions of
lawmaking and of justice, so there were no legal alternatives, at least if we ignore the
possible recourse to international law and institutions. But the point of asking about legal
alternatives isn’t a positivist attempt to figure out whether the governing law prohibited
or permitted the acts in question. Rather, the point is just to flesh out the cost-benefit
calculus—to help judges and juries determine, from the law’s rough-hewn utilitarian
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perspective, whether there were courses of action, other than the crime charged, which
would have avoided the threatened harm at lower social cost. It is not enough, in other
words, to show that the harmful crime avoided an even greater harm; it must also be true
that there were no less harmful actions in the feasible set.
In the transitional-justice setting the key question is identical: was complicity in
the old regime’s illegal or unjust action the lowest-cost alternative? Consider “Case 3”—
the Nuremberg trial of German jurists that followed upon the major war crimes trials. The
principal defendant, Schlegelberger, a former high official in the Reich Ministry of
Justice, argued that “if he were to resign, a worse man would take his place.” Although
the tribunal found “much truth” in this contention, because the atrocities committed by
Nazi police elements outside the Ministry’s control were much worse, it nonetheless
rejected the defense because “[t]he prostitution of a judicial system for the
accomplishment of criminal aims involves an element of evil to the State which is not
found in frank atrocities which do not sully judicial robes.”120 Whether or not we agree
with this assessment that the social costs of frank atrocity are lower than the costs of
judicialized murder—this is candor with a vengeance! -- the question about net social
costs is unimpeachable, and it is precisely the question nontransitional courts ask as well.
It might also be thought that the factual questions are more difficult in
transitional-justice settings, either because they are really counterfactuals—if X had
resigned from the bench, would Y, a fanatic, have taken his place?—or because they
require more facts (or counterfacts), on a larger scale, than the domestic analogues. The
first idea is just wrong; duress and necessity are always predicated on counterfactual
assertions about the consequences of hypothetical action or inaction. As for the second
idea, it too makes a fetish of the distinction between cases that evaluate conduct in past
political regimes and cases that do not; the scale of the relevant factual and counterfactual
questions is, sometimes, as great or greater in the second category of cases. Consider
real-life examples, in which courts have reached varying and fact-sensitive decisions:
whether the activities of the Internal Revenue Service may be obstructed to protest the
government’s financial aid to El Salvador (no)121; whether a public-health organization
may operate an illegal needle exchange program to combat the spread of AIDS (yes in
some jurisdictions, no in others)122; whether a private posse may round up and deport
striking miners who planned to destroy lives and property (yes)123; and (most famously)
whether seamen adrift in a lifeboat may cannibalize a sickly cabin boy to stay alive
(no)124.
Conversely, the factual inquiries needed to resolve the Schindler’s list defense in
transitional settings are often no more complex than in nontransitional settings. In both
contexts courts eschew high-level abstractions, render factbound decisions, and use
sentencing adjustments and other techniques to avoid all-or-nothing pronouncements.
Consider the trial of five Vichy judges who had, in 1941, “sentenced three Communists
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to death in reprisal for the shooting of a German officer. The Germans had originally
demanded ten executions; after negotiations, the victims were finally reduced to three—
all of whom had been in prison at the time of the shooting.”125 Moral theorists will
recognize this as an old ethical chestnut.126 Practical jurists will instead be inclined to
keep their conclusions at a lower level of abstraction, assessing each defendant’s
culpability in light of his particular role in events, and adjusting punishment accordingly.
This is what the Gaullist court did; it sentenced “four of the five judges . . . to terms
ranging from life at hard labor to two years in prison; one, who had opposed the sentence,
was acquitted.”127
The point here is not to take sides in the debate between moral theorists and
pragmatists.128 It is to emphasize that the debate cuts across the distinction between
transitional and nontransitional justice. By (implicitly) faulting transitional courts for
deciding cases without resolving all relevant moral conundrums, the critics hold
transitional courts to a higher standard than nontransitional courts; the discrepancy
suggests that the higher standard is unrealistic.
4. Everyone did it
The fourth excuse—that everyone is implicated—reflects two distinct ideas: that
it is wrong to punish some people when everyone is guilty, and that it is impossible to use
ordinary notions of guilt and innocence when evaluating conduct in a pretransitional
society.129 Quint argues that the Western officials who prosecuted and judged cases
against former officials of the GDR did not really understand what happened in East
Germany. In a case involving election fraud in 1989, the “court rejected defense
counsel’s claim that, since all elections in the GDR were fundamentally fraudulent, [the
defendant’s] acts could not really constitute election fraud.”130 Quint thinks the court’s
ruling reflects incomprehension about the nature of life in a totalitarian regime rather
than, what is more likely, a conventional legal subterfuge for performing substantive
albeit retroactive justice. And if the Westerners did not fully understand the East German
past, the Easterners surely did, and many of them complained bitterly that justice was not
more severe. But his larger point—that normative transformations accompanying
transitions make judgments about the past hazardous—is widely shared.
However, normative transformations are not unknown in societies with
consolidated democracies. In the United States the clearest was the nationwide
transformation of racial attitudes during the second half of the twentieth century. As we
discussed in II.A., this transformation has embarrassed public officials who supported
segregation in the 1950s and 1960s, from Harold Carswell to Trent Lott. But there have
been other transformations as well. The backlash against communism after World War II
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cast suspicion on many officials who sympathized with communism in the 1930s. The
backlash against drug use in the 1980s and 1990s embarrassed public officials who used
drugs as young adults in the 1960s and 1970s. But the most serious transformations result
in more significant public action than the resignation of officials. Changing racial
attitudes contributed to the decision to provide reparations to Indian tribes and to
Americans of Japanese descent who were interned during World War II. They have also
contributed to the adoption of affirmative action and proposals to award reparations to the
descendants of slaves. In none of these cases did the implication of American society—as
beneficiaries (arguably) of the actions and institutions—rather than a few wrongdoers
provide a reason for not performing reparative justice.
There is no doubt that many people find it hard to imagine themselves sharing
attitudes that were once widespread but are now taboo. But the public does seem to take a
realistic view, and does not demand from officials a past life free of actions that are
blameworthy by current standards. Instead, the public requires a clear repudiation of
these past actions as evidence that the officials share the new attitudes or will not work
against them. People at the vanguard of change—the dissenters and dissidents who are
eventually vindicated—take on heroic status, but those who resisted change are not
necessarily condemned. This is true for consolidated democracies and it is true for
transitional democracies. The people who judge the past during a transition are the same
as the people who lived in the past. They are capable of distinguishing those who
passively collaborated and those who used force against change; those who repudiate
their past actions and those who work to undermine reform. Certainly, as overemphasized
in the literature, people will sometimes deceive themselves, invent myths, scapegoat, and
forget. But people do these things in consolidated democracies as well. That people in
posttransitional societies can make reasonable moral distinctions is proven by the
survival of many of the communist parties in eastern Europe, which refashioned
themselves as leftist parties in the posttransition electoral system after shedding secret
police chiefs, torturers, and others from the old regime whose behavior was reprehensible
by any standard.
Quint brings together many of the criticisms of transitional justice in his
discussion of the prosecution of former officials of the GDR. He argues that the cases
criminalized the ordinary politics of the GDR rather than picking out moments of great
injustice. And because most of the penalties were mild, “this immense expenditure of
effort seems to serve little more than the function of bringing facts before the public and
of labeling the former functionaries of the GDR as criminals ... rather than actually
serving any of the more traditional goals of criminal law.”131 One could say exactly the
same thing about denazification, which involved the processing of millions of German
citizens, but, because of resource constraints, with relatively few punishments and most
of them trivial.132 But criminal law frequently serves an educative function: it stigmatizes
forms of lawbreaking that are harmful but widely tolerated. The prosecutions of former
officials of the GDR had a grander scope than domestic prosecutions do, but they could
be justified, and were widely believed to be justified, by the criminality of the regime.
The post-GDR prosecutions, like the denazification process, made the point that the
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activities of the prior regime were wrongful rather than just a matter of political
disagreement.
CONCLUSION
The urge to wipe the slate clean and start at Year 0 is deep and understandable,
but it has been resisted by most states that go through transitions because wiping the slate
clean does not erase the memories of the victims or the continuing influence of the old
regime’s perpetrators and supporters. Nonetheless, the dominant view in the academic
literature is that transitional justice is not worth doing because it interferes with the
development of democratic institutions and the market economy. The interference takes
diverse forms: overburdening courts, undermining property rights, depriving the
government of experienced personnel, draining the treasury, burdening officials with
complex technical problems, and confronting people with insoluble moral dilemmas. We
have shown that these objections are overblown. Transitional justice below the regime
level is a feature of nontransitional states, and in these states the costs of transitional
justice are always balanced pragmatically against the benefits rather than assumed in
every case to be decisive. The many parallels between transitional and ordinary justice
are overlooked by the academics but recognized and exploited by transitional institutions,
and this no doubt has contributed to the successes of transitional justices in those states
that have tried.
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